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12 UNNECESSARY MEN: THE CASE
FOR ELIMINATING JURY TRIALS IN
DRUNK DRIVING CASES
Adam M. Gershowitz*
Over the last few decades, states have imposed tougher
punishments on drunk drivers. This Article argues that increasing
punishments is counterproductive. If legislatures are seeking to hold
guilty offenders accountable and deter drunk driving, they should
keep punishments low and instead abolish the right to jury trials.
Under the petty offense doctrine, the Supreme Court has authorized
states to abolish jury trials when defendants face a maximum sentence
of six months' incarceration. Social science evidence has long
demonstrated that judges are more likely to convict than juries,
particularly in drunk driving cases. And researchers have found that
the certainty of punishment, not the severity of punishment, is the key
factor in maximizing deterrence. Thus, by keeping maximum
sentences for most drunk drivers at six months or less, states could
abolish jury trials, thereby raising conviction rates and improving
general deterrence. Additionally, bench trials would be far more
efficient because the greater certainty of conviction would give
defendants an incentive to plead guilty rather than taking their cases
to trial. When trials do occur, they would be much faster because
lawyers would not have to select juries or present detailed
background testimony to already knowledgeable judges. At present,
only a handful of states have eliminated jury trials for drunk drivers.
This Article outlines the specific steps that states should take to
abolish jury trials and thereby increase convictions, maximize general
deterrence, and more efficiently handle one of the most common
crimes in the United States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, states have become much tougher' on
defendants charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI).2 Legislatures
have increased penalties not only for recidivists but also for first-time
offenders.3 In most states, first-time DWI defendants now face up to six
months in jail, and many jurisdictions authorize maximum sentences of
one year or longer.' Although states should be commended for
addressing the DWI problem,' a primary focus on punishment is
insufficient and may actually be counterproductive.6 Legislatures would
be better served by maintaining modest sanctions for first-time offenders
while invoking the perfectly constitutional -though rarely used-option
of eliminating the right to a jury trial for DWI defendants who face no
more than six months in jail. Bench trials before more conviction-prone
judges will "get tough" on DWI offenders by holding more defendants
accountable and enhancing general deterrence prospects through greater
certainty of punishment. At the same time, a bench trial regime will
decrease the importance of high-priced criminal defense lawyers
available only to wealthy defendants and will vastly improve the
efficiency of processing one of the most common crimes in the United
States.
For over four decades, social science evidence has demonstrated
that, when presented with identical cases,' judges are more willing to
1. See H. Laurence Ross et al., Can Mandatory Jail Laws Deter Drunk Driving? The Arizona
Case, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 156 (1990) ("The political climate of the 1980s in America
has led to the view that drunk driving is a violent crime, properly punishable with time served in jail.").
2. States have various names and degrees of severity for drunk driving offenses. For ease of
exposition, I will refer to them as "DWI" prosecutions throughout this Article.
3. See, e.g., GERALD D. ROBIN, WAGING THE BATTLE AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING: ISSUES,
COUNTERMEASURES, AND EFFECTIVENESS 10-11 (1991); Sandy Harrison, Assortment of Laws Set to
Debut - Good News and Bad News for Consumers as Regulations Kick in at Midnight, DAILY NEWS
L.A., Dec. 31, 1990, at N1 (noting increase in penalty for first-time California drunk drivers); Matt
Nelson, Drunken Drivers Slip Through Cracks, State Tightens Penalties for Offenders, DULUTH NEWS
TRIB., July 18, 1997, at Al (noting that the Minnesota legislature voted to double the maximum
penalty for defendants convicted of third or subsequent DWIs).
4. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
5. Drunk driving is an enormous problem that kills over 10,000 people every year and causes
billions of dollars in property damage. Statistics, MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, http:I/www.
madd.org/statistics/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2011).
6. There has been a modest reduction in the rate of DWI arrests in recent years. See LAURAN
M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. NCJ 172212,
SPECIAL REPORT: DWI OFFENDERS UNDER CORRECTIONAL SUPERVISION 1 (1999), http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdfldwiocs.pdf. However, to the extent drunk driving has declined, that may be
due less to legislation and more to the moral campaign waged by groups like MADD to make drunk
driving stigmatic. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607,634 (2000).
7. On their face, trial statistics seem to show that judges acquit more than juries. Yet, this is
misleading. The most commonly accepted explanation is that juries are less accurate at determining
guilt so smart defendants waive their right to a jury when the evidence is weakest and stick with juries
when the evidence of guilt is most compelling. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the
Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1501 (1999) ("If juries are less accurate guilt determiners
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convict than juries.8 Jurors' reluctance to convict cuts across a range of
offenses, but it appears to be particularly troublesome for the crime of
DWI. Unlike most offenses in the criminal code-think of murder,
arson, or theft, for instance-many jurors in DWI cases can put
themselves in the defendant's shoes and imagine, "There but for the
grace of God go I."9
And unlike judges who are repeat players in the criminal justice
system and see hundreds of DWI cases, juries are likely much more
susceptible to courtroom theatrics or meritless challenges to the validity
of the prosecution's case. 0 Defendants who take DWI cases to trial are
often middle-class or wealthy and can afford to hire the best lawyers who
specialize in DWI defense." These lawyers challenge the complicated
sobriety tests that prove intoxication and are more likely to make
headway with jurors who have never seen a DWI case before rather than
a judge who has presided over numerous DWI trials and is aware of the
reliability of the tests. Moreover, unlike most other areas of law in which
appointed defense lawyers are often out-matched by experienced
prosecutors, 12 DWI cases actually represent the reverse scenario.
Because DWI cases are usually low-level misdemeanors, it is often
inexperienced prosecutors who are left to square off against highly paid
defense attorneys.13
Put simply, jurors in DWI cases are more likely to be confronted
with extra-legal factors that favor the defense or demand a higher
standard of proof than the law specifies. Shifting from jury trials to
bench trials would therefore almost certainly increase the DWI
conviction rate.
A higher conviction rate would not only increase the number of
guilty defendants held accountable, but it would also further general
deterrence goals. Researchers have long found that the certainty of
than judges, innocent defendants will choose to be tried by judges rather than run the risk of jury
mistake, while guilty defendants will choose to be tried by juries, hoping for a mistake. The acquittal
rate should therefore be higher in bench trials-and it is.") (emphasis omitted).
8. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 56-59 (1966).
9. See Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in
Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1079 (2006) (offering reasons why jurors may be more lenient
than judges).
10. See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q.
151, 187 (2005) ("A few defense counsel ... acknowledged that judges were less likely to be persuaded
by creative defense techniques (as one lawyer put it, 'judges are more likely to see through our
strategy'), perhaps a tacit admission that juries are more easily misdirected than judges are.").
11. See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the quality of DWI defense lawyers).
12. The classic example is death penalty cases, where many defendants are represented by
inexperienced or inadequate defense lawyers and prosecuted by experienced district attorneys. See
generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties'
Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REv. 307 (2010) (discussing traditional disparities between
state prosecutors and appointed defense attorneys).
13. See Leipold, supra note 10, at 181 ("The prosecutor assigned to the case is probably going to
be less experienced than those assigned to felonies.").
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punishment, not the severity of punishment, is the single best deterrent
to future misconduct.14  By moving to bench trials and increasing
conviction rates, states would be more likely to maximize the chances of
deterring future drunk driving.
At the same time that eliminating jury trials would increase
conviction rates, states would also save considerable money and
resources. Moving exclusively to bench trials would eliminate the time-
consuming process of jury selection" and would considerably reduce the
need for trial lawyers to present lengthy background information at trial
that must be conveyed to first-time DWI jurors, but not experienced
judges.
More importantly, eliminating jury trials would reduce prosecutors'
caseloads. Not only would trials take less time, but there would actually
be fewer cases that make it all the way to trial. Defendants forced to
appear before more conviction-prone judges would have even greater
incentive to plea bargain, thus moving cases off of prosecutors' dockets.16
In a world without jury trials for DWI cases, prosecutors would be in a
position to devote more time to their other cases.
Finally, unlike more serious crimes, increasing DWI convictions
would not clog already overcrowded jails. Despite lobbying efforts by
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and other organizations to
toughen maximum sanctions, the vast majority of misdemeanor DWI
defendants are actually sentenced to probation or very short jail
sentences."
While eliminating the right to a jury trial may initially seem to be a
radical idea, it is actually a realistic proposal that can be easily
implemented under existing precedent.'" Longstanding Supreme Court
doctrine provides that defendants only have a federal constitutional right
to a jury trial when they face more than six months in jail.19 Because
many states impose a maximum sentence of only a few months in jail for
first-time DWI offenders, states are free to try such defendants in bench
14. See infra notes 165-88 and accompanying text.
15. The time includes not just the questioning of jurors, but also argument over which jurors
should be struck for cause and whether any peremptory challenges have been improperly used based
on race or gender. See William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient,
1987 SUP. Cr. REv. 97, 138-40 (discussing how time-consuming voir dire was before Batson and
explaining that the decision adds "a new level of complexity" and amounts to "a step in the wrong
direction as far as the efficiency of the system is concerned").
16. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2463,
2501-02 (2004) (explaining that when defendants have less control and less cause for optimism, they
are more willing to plea bargain).
17. A 1997 study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that of 513,200 DWI offenders under
supervision of the criminal justice system, more than 450,000 were on probation. See MARUSCHAK,
supra note 6, at 1.
18. The proposal is foreclosed in a small number of states that have interpreted their state
constitutions to require a right to a jury trial in all criminal cases. See infra Parts VI.C.
19. See infra Part III.
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trials so long as their state constitutions do not provide a more expansive
jury trial protection than the U.S. Constitution. Legislatures would only
have to amend their existing statutes to strike out the jury trial
guarantee.
In sum, eliminating jury trials in misdemeanor DWI cases would
likely increase conviction rates, further deterrence goals, save states
money, and enable prosecutors to focus their attention on other cases, all
while leaving jail populations largely unaffected. Yet, only a handful of
states have adopted this approach.2 0
This Article offers a detailed explanation of why eliminating the
right to a jury trial for misdemeanor DWI defendants is the right
approach. Part II briefly surveys the development of DWI laws from
around the country over the last few decades. Part II explains how,
despite considerable legislative efforts to decrease the DWI problem, the
vast majority of first-time DWI defendants face maximum sentences of
six months or less. Part III then reviews Supreme Court precedent
holding that such defendants have no federal constitutional right to ajury trial. Part IV is the heart of the Article. It first reviews the social
science literature demonstrating that judges are typically more likely to
convict than juries. Part IV goes beyond the empirical literature to
discuss reasons why juries in DWI cases may be more reluctant to convict
than experienced judges. Part V sets forth the argument why eliminating
the right to a jury trial would be a positive step forward. Part V reviews
the literature demonstrating that increased conviction rates serve as a
better deterrent than harsher punishments. Part V also explains how the
use of bench trials rather than juries will save time and resources that
prosecutors' offices can redirect to other important areas. Finally, Part
VI discusses the particular steps that states should take to revise their
statutes to eliminate the right to a jury trial for misdemeanor DWI
prosecutions.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DWI LAWS OVER THE LAST FEW DECADES
Although drunk driving has existed as long as there have been
vehicles, the movement to combat it did not begin in earnest until the
late 1970s and early 1980s.2 1 Prior to this "modem era," DWI was
treated as just another traffic violation.22
In 1978, the group Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID) was founded
in upstate New York, and in 1980 the more well-known MADD was
20. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
21. See JAMES B. JACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, at xv (1989).
22. See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social
Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 67-68 (2002) (explaining
that drunk driving prohibitions were sumptuary offenses like "blue laws" and that "[slignificant
penalties for violating sumptuary laws were long inconsistent with popular attitudes").
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formed in California.23 Shortly thereafter, chapters of both organizations,
as well as Students Against Drunk Driving, began to spring up around
the country.24 In subsequent years, lobbying by these organizations led to
a toughening of DWI laws around the country?2
In the early 1980s, Congress26 passed legislation conditioning federal
highway funding on states adopting a .10 blood alcohol level for
intoxication and raising the drinking age to twenty-one.27  Not only did
states respond to this legislation to keep their federal dollars, they also
passed legislation of their own to impose more severe punishments on
drunk drivers. 8 As Professor James Jacobs explains, states "enacted
mandatory jail terms, more-severe fines, and automatic and lengthier
license suspensions and revocations." 29
Despite the considerable toughening of DWI laws over the last
thirty years, however, the maximum sentences for DWI remain
comparatively light in many jurisdictions. This is particularly true for
first offenders. In New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, first offenders face
no jail time, only a fine.30 In Mississippi, the maximum sentence for first
offenders is forty-eight hours' incarceration." First-time defendants in
Hawaii face a maximum of only five days.32 The maximum sentence in
Kentucky, New Jersey, North Dakota, and South Carolina is thirty days
in jail.33 Indiana, Maryland, and Nebraska cap punishment for first
offenders at two months.3 4  Another three states impose maximum
punishments of roughly three months.35
Most states are slightly tougher on first offenders. The most
common statutory design, adopted by nearly twenty states, imposes a
23. JACOBS, supra note 21, at xv.
24. Id. at xvi.
25. ROBIN, supra note 3, at 8-14.
26. See H. LAURENCE Ross, CONFRONTING DRUNK DRIVING: SOCIAL POLICY FOR SAVING
LIVES 83 (1992) ("Between 1976 and 1980, eleven states raised their minimum drinking ages from
eighteen to nineteen, twenty, or twenty-one.").
27. See JACOBS, supra note 21, at xvi-xvii.
28. Today, every state in the nation has enacted per se laws making it unlawful to operate a
motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of .08. See Tina Wescott Cafaro, You Drink, You
Drive, You Lose: Or Do You?, 42 GONz. L. REV. 1, 25 (2006).
29. JACOBS, supra note 21, at xvii. States also stepped up police enforcement through
roadblocks and patrols, leading to a fifty-percent increase in drunk driving arrests between the mid-
1970s and mid-1980s. Id. at xvii-xviii.
30. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265-A:18 (Supp. 2009); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3804(a)(1), (c)(1)
(2006) (setting a maximum punishment of probation and a $300 fine if the offender took the blood
test, but imposing at least seventy-two hours incarceration for offenders who refused the breath test).
31. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-11-30(2)(a) (2004).
32. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 291E-61(b)(1)(C)(ii) (2010).
33. See KY. REV. STAT ANN. § 189A.010(5)(a) (West 2009); N.J. STAT. § 39:4-50(a)(1)(ii) (Supp.
2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01(6) (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2940 (Supp. 2009).
34. See IND. CODE. §§ 9-30-5-1(a), 35-50-3-4 (2004 & 2009) (sixty days); MD. CODE ANN., TRASP.
§ 27-101(q)(1) (West Supp. 2010) (limiting punishment to two months); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-106(1)
(2008) (sixty days).
35. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625(9)(a)(2) (2010) (ninety-three days); MINN. STAT.
§ 169A.27 (2006) (ninety days); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(E) (2004) (ninety days).
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maximum sentence of six months for first-time offenders. 6 Fifteen states
have regimes that carry a possible sentence of one year.3 1 Only three
states have adopted a scheme in which first-time offenders face a possible
sentence in excess of one year." In sum, in more than two-thirds of the
states, defendants face a maximum sentence of six months' incarceration,
and often much less.39
Yet, even these low maximum sentences are deceiving because it is
rare to see defendants sentenced anywhere close to the statutory
maximum. Defendants facing months or even one year in jail often
receive only probation. For instance, in Texas, a first-time DWI is a
Class B misdemeanor punishable by a maximum sentence of 180 days injail.4 Although the statute provides for a minimum term of seventy-two
hours' imprisonment, first offenders with clean criminal records regularly
receive probated sentences and serve no jail time.4 1 In Massachusetts,
first-time offenders face the toughest penalty in the nation-two-and-a-
half years-but even a single day in jail is rarely imposed.42
At bottom, the reality of DWI prosecutions in the United States is
that most defendants are first offenders facing a maximum sentence of
36. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-707(A)(1), 28-1381(C) (Supp. 2010); CAL. VEH. CODE§ 23536 (West Supp. 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227a(g)(1) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.21§ 4177(d)(1) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 316.193(2)(a)(2)(a) (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8005(l)(a)
(Supp. 2010); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(c)(3) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1567(d) (Supp. 2008);
LA. REV. STAT. 14:98(B)(1) (2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.010 (West 2003); MONT. CODE § 61-8-714
(2009); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484C.400(1)(a)(2) (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(G)(1)(a) (West
Supp. 2010); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.22, 49.04(b) (West 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-503(West Supp. 2010); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-2 ( 2011); WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1) (West 2010); WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 31-5-233(e) (2009).
37. See ALA. CODE § 32-5A-191(e) (2009); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.135(a) (2010); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-65-111(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1301(7) (Supp. 2009); GA. CODE
ANN. § 40-6-391(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 2010); IOWA CODE §§ 321J.2, 903.1(1)(b) (Supp. 2010); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252(2)(D), tit. 29, § 2411(5) (2006 & 2010); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1193(1)(b) (McKinney 1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-902(c)(1) (2007); OR. REV. STAT.§ 813.010(4) (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2(d)(1) (Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-2(1)
(2006); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 55-10-403(s)(1) (Supp. 2009); VA. CODE § 18.2-270 (2009); WASH. REV.
CODE § 46.61.5055(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 2010).
38. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (2005) (two-and-a-half years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
17 9(g) (2009) (two years); VT. STAT. tit. 23, § 1210 (Supp. 2010) (two years).
39. Of course, repeat offenders face more severe sentences. Yet, most DWI offenders are not
recidivists and the overwhelming majority of criminal prosecutions are for first-time DWI offenses.
See JAMES H. HEDLUND & ANNE T. MCCARTr, AAA FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, DRUNK
DRIVING: SEEKING ADDITIONAL SOLUTIONS, at vi (2002) ("About one-third of all drivers arrested or
convicted of DWI are repeat offenders.").
40. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(b) (classifying the crime as a Class B misdemeanor); id.§ 12.22(2) (providing that Class B misdemeanors shall be punished by "confinement in jail for a term
not to exceed 180 days").
41. Id. § 49.04(b). Lawyers specializing in DWI defense are not reluctant to advertise that
properly defended DWI prosecutions can result in no jail time. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions,
TYLER FLOOD & ASSOC., P.L.L.C., http://www.texasdwidefenselawyer.com/drunk-driving-faqs.html
(last visited Mar. 19, 2011) ("If you have a clean criminal record and there were no serious injuries
resulting from your first misdemeanor DWI, you should not have to worry about doing any additionaljail time. In Harris County, probation is an option as an alternative to jail time.").
42. See infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
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six months and in practice they have very low odds of being sentenced to
jail at all, much less the statutory maximum. Yet, DWI trials are very
common occurrences in criminal courthouses across the country.
Defendants often fight very hard to avoid conviction, thus utilizing
enormous prosecutorial and judicial resources. As the next Part
discusses, many (though not all) states can take relatively simple
measures to improve efficiency, conviction rates, and deterrence
prospects by eliminating jury trials in DWI cases.
III. THERE IS NO FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
FOR PETTY OFFENSES CARRYING SIX MONTHS' OR LESS
INCARCERATION
Although popular culture portrays criminal defendants' right to a
jury trial as sacrosanct, there are actually numerous restrictions on the
jury trial right that conflict with public perception. Defendants are not
entitled to the infamous jury of twelve,43 nor to a verdict that is
unanimous." Indeed, in many criminal cases, defendants actually have
no federal constitutional right to a jury trial at all. The so-called "petty
offense doctrine" provides that certain minor crimes are exempt from the
right to a jury trial. A review of the history of that doctrine shows how
run-of-the-mill, first-time DWI charges fit in this category and can
therefore be exempt from the jury trial guarantee.
In 1968, during the height of the Warren Court's criminal procedure
revolution, the Supreme Court incorporated the right to a jury trial. In
Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court considered the case of a black defendant
accused of assaulting a white victim in a racially tense environment. 45
Duncan, who faced up to two years' imprisonment under battery charges,
had no statutory right to a jury trial under Louisiana law.46 The Court
found the Louisiana procedure to be unconstitutional on the ground that
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury is fundamental and cannot be
eliminated by the states.' Although the Court used sweeping language
to explain the importance of the jury trial right, the Court refused to
apply it to all cases. As the Court explained:
It is doubtless true that there is a category of petty crimes or
offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial
provision and should not be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment
jury trial requirement here applied to the States. Crimes carrying
possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they
43. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,86 (1970) (upholding a six-person jury).
44. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362-63 (1972) (permitting a nine-to-three jury
verdict).
45. 391 U.S. 145,147 (1968).
46. Id. at 146.
47. Id. at 145-50.
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otherwise qualify as petty offenses. But the penalty authorized for
a particular crime is of major relevance in determining whether it is
serious or not and may in itself, if severe enough, subject the trial to
the mandates of the Sixth Amendment.48
Looking to English common law and the colonial period, the Court
stated that petty offenses were regularly tried without juries.49 Citing the
benefits of efficiency and simplicity, the Duncan Court concluded that
the benefits of eliminating jury trials outweighed any negative
consequences to criminal defendants charged with petty offenses. 0 And
from a historical point of view, the Court found no reason to believe that
the framers disagreed with eliminating jury trials for petty offenses."
When it came to drawing the line separating petty from serious
offenses, the Court was more equivocal. Relying on the approach in the
federal system, the Court appeared to endorse the idea that petty
offenses were those where the defendant could be sentenced to no more
than six months' incarceration.52 Yet, the Court left the "exact location"
for another day.53
A few years later, in Baldwin v. New York,- the Court sought to
clarify the parameters of the petty offense doctrine. In a case in which
the defendant faced up to one year of imprisonment for a misdemeanor
offense of pickpocketing, the Court concluded that states could not
eliminate the right to a jury trial." Drawing a brighter-line rule than in
Duncan, the Court held "that no offense can be deemed 'petty' for
purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than
six months is authorized."56 Thus, every criminal defendant facing more
than six months in jail was guaranteed a jury trial.
The Baldwin Court declined to resolve at least one remaining
question: Are all offenses punishable by six months or less in jail
automatically deemed petty? Put differently, could a crime carrying a
shorter jail sentence still be serious enough to require a jury trial if it also
imposed other punishments, such as stiff fines or loss of other rights?
The Court addressed this question in Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas,
a DWI case in which the defendant faced a maximum sentence of six
months in jail as well as a $1000 fine or forty-eight hours of community
service while dressed in clothing identifying him as a DWI offender. 7
The Court accepted the proposition that collateral sanctions could
48. Id. at 159 (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 160.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 161.
53. Id.
54. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
55. Id. at 67-69.
56. Id. at 69.
57. 489 U.S. 538, 544 (1989).
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guarantee a defendant facing six months or less in jail a right to a jury
trial," but it rejected the argument that defendant's case rose to that
level." The Court concluded that a DWI defendant facing six months'
incarceration, a stiff fine, community service, and possible shaming from
having to wear clothing identifying him as a DWI offender did not
guarantee the right to a jury trial.'
The Blanton decision was unanimous and signaled with
unmistakable clarity that states are free to punish defendants with up to
six months in jail as well as ancillary penalties without first providing
them with a jury trial. Yet, fewer than ten states have invoked the option
to eliminate the right to a jury trial for low-level DWI offenses.'
IV. ELIMINATING JURY TRIALS WILL LEAD TO HIGHER CONVICTION
RATES IN DWI CASES
As outlined below, there is considerable empirical and qualitative
evidence that judges are more willing to convict than juries.6 2  The
evidence is particularly robust in DWI cases.
A. Empirical Research Has Found that Judges Are More Willing to
Convict than Juries
Over forty years ago, researchers Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel
published a landmark study that analyzed the extent to which trial judges
agreed with juries' verdicts in more than 3500 criminal jury trials.6 3 After
juries made the decision whether to convict or acquit, the trial judges
completed questionnaires stating whether they disagreed with the verdict
58. Id. at 542.
59. Id. at 543-44.
60. Id. at 544-45.
61. The states that have taken this approach are: Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 265-A:2, 18 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); Blanton, 489 U.S. at 539; Johnson v. State, 994 So. 2d 960, 962-
63 (Fla. 2008); State v. Sullivan, 36 P.3d 803, 807 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Vu, 846 So. 2d 67, 71
(La. Ct. App. 2003); Case v. State, 817 So. 2d 605, 606-07 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Graff, 577
A.2d 1270 (N.J. 1990); Meyer v. Jones, 749 P.2d 93, 96 (N.M. 1988); Commonwealth v. Kerry, 906 A.2d
1237,1239-40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). Additionally, New York has eliminated the right to a jury trial for
the "traffic infraction" of Driving While Ability Impaired, in which the defendant has a blood alcohol
level below .08 but above .05. See People v. Harris, 828 N.Y.S.2d 832, 838-39 (N.Y. City Ct. 2006).
This infraction carries a maximum penalty of fifteen days' incarceration, whereas the traditional
charge of Driving While Intoxicated carries a maximum sentence of one year. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.
LAW § 1193(1)(a)-(b) (West 1996).
62. See infra Part IV.A.
63. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 8, at 3-4,9-10,33.
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and the reasons for that disagreement.' The Kalven and Zeisel study
remains the gold standard for jury analysis to this day.6
Kalven and Zeisel found that juries and judges agreed in
approximately 78% of cases." In the remaining cases, the data indicated
that judges were much more willing to convict than juries. Juries
convicted in only 3% of cases where the judge would have acquitted.6 1
By contrast, in 19% of cases, juries acquitted a defendant who the judge
would have convicted." In sum, jurors were more lenient than judges in
16% of cases. 9 Based on the narrative responses provided by judges,
Kalven and Zeisel determined that juror leniency resulted not from
confusion about the evidence or the law, but because jurors demanded a
greater degree of proof than judges to find a defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. 70
Even more telling than the overall 16% leniency rate was the
unwillingness of jurors to convict in DWI cases. Kalven and Zeisel
studied forty-two categories of crime ranging from murder and
kidnapping on the serious end, to petty larceny and public disorder on
the less serious end.7 1 Interestingly, the most common crime in the study
by a considerable margin was DWI.72  Of the 3576 cases Kalven and
Zeisel studied, a total of 455, or nearly 13% of the sample, were DWI
prosecutions.73  Remarkably, the jury leniency rate jumped from 16%
(the total for all crimes in the entire study) to 24% in DWI offenses. 74
Once again, judges would have acquitted in only 3% of cases where
juries convicted.7 By contrast, in a staggering 27% of DWI cases, judges
believed the evidence merited a conviction even though juries
acquitted.76 In other words, judges would have convicted more than one
in four defendants juries acquitted.
Of course, one might be inclined to explain the high percentage of
DWI cases in which juries acquitted as a product of the times. Public
64. See id. at 45-54.
65. See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The American Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY 323, 323 (1991) (describing The American Jury as "[a]rguably one of the most important
books in the field of law and social science").
66. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 8, at 56. The authors distributed the 5.5% of hung juries
evenly between convictions and acquittals. Id. at 57-58. Separating out the hung juries results in a
slightly lower percentage of agreement (75%) as well as slightly lower percentages of disagreement
between judges and juries. See id. at 56 tbl.11.
67. Id. at 59.
68. Id.
69. See id. This figure is derived by subtracting the 3% of cases where judges would have
acquitted (but juries convicted) from the 19% of cases where judges convicted (but juries acquitted).
70. See id. at 106-11.
71. Id. at 66-67.
72. Id. at 67 tbl.17.
73. Id.
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attitudes toward DWI certainly were more tolerant in the 1950s than
they are today, thus making it difficult to draw any present conclusions
from a study that is nearly a half-century old." Yet, Kalven and Zeisel
took a step toward controlling for this problem by questioning judges
whether the community considered its DWI laws to be too severe. In
jurisdictions where the perception was that DWI laws were too strict,
jurors acquitted in 33% of cases where judges would have convicted.78
Yet, even in jurisdictions where the community did not believe DWI laws
were too harsh, the jury still acquitted in 22% of cases where judges
believed convictions should have occurred.79
Kalven and Zeisel offered a number of possible reasons for juror
leniency in DWI cases. First, they believed that juror hostility to
breathalyzers accounted for many acquittals." Second, many jurors
believed the punishment for DWI was too severe.1 Less commonly,
jurors acquitted because, although there was proof of a sufficiently high
blood alcohol ratio (which was legally sufficient to convict), there was no
evidence that the defendant drove badly8 Finally, Kalven and Zeisel
found that some jurors voted to acquit because they, too, were drinkers
and feared, "There but for the Grace of God go I."8
More than four decades after its publication, Kalven and Zeisel's
work remains the definitive study on the rate of agreement between
judges and juries.M Despite calls for replication,"8 funding problems and
the inability to interest busy actors in the criminal justice system have
impeded scholars from producing a study of the same breadth.
Nevertheless, smaller studies confirm Kalven and Zeisel's central
conclusion that judges are more willing to convict than juries.
The most thorough follow-up study was undertaken by Theodore
Eisenberg and his colleagues in 2005." Using data assembled by the
National Center for State Courts, researchers questioned judges,
attorneys, and jurors who had participated in felony trials in four
77. Kahan, supra note 6, at 634 (explaining that advocacy group campaigns were significant
primarily because of their "effect[s] on public attitudes, which became suddenly more condemnatory
in the late 1980s").
78. KALVEN & ZEISEL,supra note 8, at 468-69.
79. Id. at 469.
80. Id. at 294 ("In many cases the issue seems to be entirely evidentiary, with the jury showing
hostility to the use of drunkometers and alcometers, so frequently relied upon in these cases.").
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 296. As I explain below, there are additional reasons why juries may be more prone to
acquit than judges. See infra Part IV.B.
84. See Wayne A. Logan, Symposium: Reflections on Kalven and Zeisel's The American Jury, 39
CRIM. L. BULL. 4, 5 (2003) ("Now over thirty-five years old, The American Jury remains the
benchmark in U.S. jury research.").
85. See Hans & Vidmar, supra note 65, at 347 ("Replication of the Kalven and Zeisel research is
much overdue.").
86. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial
Replication of Kalven and Zeisel's The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL. STUD. 171 (2005).
973No. 3]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
locations: Los Angeles County, Maricopa County (Phoenix), Bronx
County (New York), and the District of Columbia.Y
The 2005 study of judge-jury agreement largely replicated the
results of Kalven and Zeisel's 1966 work." Whereas Kalven and Zeisel
found a 78% agreement rate between judges and juries, Eisenberg and
his colleagues found a 75% agreement rate.89  The breakdown of
disagreement between judges and juries was likewise similar to what
Kalven and Zeisel had found four decades earlier. The 2005 study found
that judges would have acquitted in 6% of cases where juries convicted
(a slightly higher figure than the 3% found in 1966), but that judges
would have convicted in 19% of cases in which the jury acquitted (the
exact figure found by Kalven and Zeisel)."
Through the use of detailed questionnaires to judges and juries,
Eisenberg and his colleagues concluded that the legal and factual
complexities of the cases were "not a promising explanation of judge-jury
disagreement."9' Rather, by looking to how jurors and judges coded the
strength of the evidence as weak, medium, or strong, the researchers
were able to conclude that judges and juries have different conviction
thresholds. 92  As Professor Eisenberg and his colleagues explained,
"Judges and juries seem to be reacting to the evidence in a similar
manner, except that juries require stronger evidence to convict thanjudges do." Put differently, the primary explanation for judges andjuries reaching different conclusions appears to be that juries have a
more stringent view of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard.94
Additional, albeit smaller, studies have also replicated the findings
of Kalven and Zeisel. In a study of juror decision making, Larry Heuer
and Steven Penrod studied how legal and evidentiary complexity
affected jurors' performance in criminal and civil cases. 95 Although the
primary purpose of the study was not to study the rate of judge-jury
agreement, Heuer and Penrod did analyze seventy-seven criminal cases
for rates of agreement.' As in the previously discussed studies, they
found that judges were more likely to convict, with a net jury leniency
87. Id. at 174. The study was both broader and narrower than the Kalven and Zeisel study. It
was broader in that it inquired not just of judges, but also jurors and attorneys. It was narrower in that
it was limited to felonies and had a sample size of 382 viable cases. See id. at 174-78.
88. Id. at 204 ("By controlling for multiple observers' views of evidentiary strength, we can
confirm with additional rigor, albeit in a smaller sample, Kalven and Zeisel's finding that judges tend
to convict more than juries-at least in the class of cases selected for trial by jury.").
89. Id. at 180-81.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 191.
92. Id. at 185-89.
93. Id. at 189.
94. Id. at 185.
95. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning
and Its Effects, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 29 (1994).
96. Id. at 48.
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rate of 18.2%.1 In the Heuer and Penrod study, judges would have
convicted in 20.8% of cases where juries acquitted, while acquitting in
only 2.6% of the cases where juries convicted.98
One final study of judge-jury agreement specifically examined
whether judges and juries reached the same conclusions in DWI cases.9
Rebecca Snyder Bromley, a Colorado judge, studied sixty DWI trials in
Colorado by using post-trial questionnaires of judges and jurors." As in
previous studies, Bromley found that judges would have convicted more
often than juries.o' In 26.7% of cases, judges would have convicted even
though juries voted to acquit.'" Although judges would have acquitted in
a surprising 15% of cases where juries convicted, overall the judges were
still considerably more willing to convict. 0 Bromley found that judges
would have convicted in 73.4% of DWI cases they observed while juries
only convicted in 61.7% of cases.104
In sum, the studies to address the issue have consistently found that
judges are willing to convict more often than juries when presented with
identical cases. 0 This research is not without its concerns though. First,
even expansive studies like Kalven and Zeisel's suffer from a sampling
problem because of the sheer size of the United States and the difficulty
of achieving fair geographical representation.'o6 Second, even with a
representative sample, there is a possibility of reporting bias. Judges
who are only presiding over trials may have an easier time saying they
would convict than if they were actually the ultimate fact-finders.'07 With
these concerns in mind though, there appears to be a sound basis for
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Rebecca Snyder Bromley, Jury Leniency in Drinking and Driving Cases Has It Changed?
1958 Versus 1993,20 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 27 (1996).
100. Id. at 27. The use of post-trial questionnaires is less desirable than having judges offer their
opinions before the jury verdict. As Professor Robbennolt has observed, "[k]nowing the jury's verdict
may cause a judge to differently evaluate aspects of the case that might affect his or her agreement."
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469,473 (2005).





105. Of course, as Daniel Givelber and Amy Farrell recently explained, just because judges would
convict more often than juries does not tell us that judges are more accurate at determining guilt. See
Daniel Givelber & Amy Farrell, Judges and Juries: The Defense Case and Differences in Acquittal
Rates, 33 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 31, 33 (2008). It could be argued that moving to bench trials will raise
the conviction rate for DWI cases at the expense of convicting the innocent. While this concern
cannot be dismissed, I do not see it as likely. Prosecutors rarely bring DWI cases to trial when the
defendant is very close to the legal limit. Moreover, even in weak cases where the defendant can
allege that the breathalyzer is incorrectly calibrated, there is still evidence that the defendant had
alcohol in his system and was driving an automobile, thus lowering (though not eliminating) the odds
of a wrongful conviction.
106. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 8, at 36 (raising this concern with their own study).
107. See Robbennolt, supra note 100, at 473.
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criminal defense lawyers' intuition that guilty defendants have a better
chance of being acquitted if their cases are heard by juries rather than
judges.os
B. The Realities of DWI Trials Likely Lead Juries to Convict Less Often
As explained in Part IV.A, social science studies (including analyses
of DWI prosecutions in particular) have found that trial judges are more
willing to convict than juries. This is not surprising. As I describe in
greater detail below, there are a variety of reasons-ranging from the
quality of DWI defense lawyers to the sympathies of jurors-that explain
why jurors are more likely to acquit than judges.
1. The Imbalanced Quality of Lawyering in DWI Cases Favors
Defendants and Is Likely to Distract Juries
The first, and perhaps most important, reason why juries are less
likely to convict DWI defendants is the quality of lawyers on both sides
of the courtroom. DWI defendants are often in a position to hire
expensive and effective defense lawyers. Conversely, the prosecutors
handling DWI prosecutions are usually far less experienced than
prosecutors handling more serious cases. To see how unusual this
scenario is and how it might affect juries more than judges, let us take a
step back to describe a typical (non-DWI) criminal case.
Run-of-the-mill criminal defendants -upwards of 80%-are
indigent and cannot afford counsel." These defendants receive the
services of the local public defender or a lawyer appointed by the court.
And the representation these indigent defendants receive is notoriously
(though not universally) poor.1t 0  Public defenders, while highly
committed to their jobs, are tremendously overworked and under-
resourced.1" They often have caseloads far in excess of what guidelines
recommend, 12 and they work in offices that lack basic necessities such as
investigative support, paralegals, and legal research databases.
Appointed lawyers in many jurisdictions suffer from the same
108. Leipold, supra note 10, at 151 ("Conventional wisdom tells us that criminal defendants are
better off in front of a jury than in front of a judge.").
109. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PUB. No. NCJ 179023, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 5 (2000) (stating that 80% of felony
defendants are indigent).
110. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1035 (2006).
111. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L.
REv. 85, 93-94, 96-97 (2007).
112. Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent Defendants,
and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 377-78 (2004).
976 [Vol. 2011
ELIMINATING JURY TRIALS FOR DRUNK DRIVING
problems:"' too much work, too little assistance, and far too little pay to
incentivize them to devote the necessary time to each case.114
Worse yet, when average indigent defendants do take their cases to
trial they will likely face talented and experienced prosecutors. When an
ordinary case fails to be resolved by plea bargaining, it is often (though
not always"') because the defendant has been offered a plea bargain
requiring a very long prison term and he sees no reason not to roll the
dice at trial. Seasoned prosecutors with considerable trial experience
typically handle such serious cases.
Thus, in the run-of-the-mill criminal case that proceeds to trial, the
imbalance in power is considerable: overworked, under-resourced, and
often inexperienced defense lawyers will face experienced prosecutors
who have tried numerous cases. To the extent that the jury is swayed by
factors beyond the evidence itself-for instance, lucid presentation of
witnesses or a compelling closing argument-it is not hard to see how
prosecutors will have the upper hand. This is not to say that the
imbalance of power and resources is a good thing-it surely is not-but
simply that it is a reality of most criminal prosecutions.
The imbalance of power is exactly the opposite in DWI cases.
Many DWI trials are handled by retained (not appointed) defense
lawyers who have greater time, resources, and experience than most of
the prosecutors they are facing.
Starting with the obvious, while there are only a few affluent
defendants charged with robbery, murder, and other violent crimes1 16 a
considerable number are charged with DWI."' Each year, there are
nearly 1.5 million DWI arrests,"8 and many are affluent defendants. As
the Bureau of Justice Statistics found, "[c]ompared to other offenders,
DWI offenders are older, better educated, and more commonly white
and male.""'
113. See Gershowitz, supra note 111, at 91-99.
114. The problem is actually worse than it first appears. The crushing caseload facing indigent
defense lawyers results in an enormous push toward plea bargaining. Thus, to the extent defense
lawyers have an opportunity to develop their legal skills they will likely become talented negotiators,
rather than skilled trial lawyers. As such, the imbalance at trial between prosecutors and indigent
defense lawyers may be even greater than expected. As Professors Scott and Stuntz have argued,
"lawyers' skill surely matters more in a trial than in a plea bargaining session .... " Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,1933 (1992).
115. Other possible explanations are that (1) the defendant irrationaly refuses to accept that the
evidence against him is strong and incorrectly believes he has a good chance with the jury, or (2) the
prosecution's case is so strong-what some prosecutors call a "whale of a case" -that the government
refuses to make an attractive plea bargain offer. Either of these scenarios could occur with
misdemeanor charges carrying relatively short jail sentences.
116. See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1795, 1802 (1998).
117. See JACOBS, supra note 21, at xxi ("[D]runk driving is not a crime associated with the poor
and dispossessed.").
118. See MARUSCHAK,supra note 6, at 1.
119. Id.
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And while both rich and poor defendants are charged with DWI, it
is the middle- or upper-class individuals who have a much greater
incentive to fight the charges all the way to trial in the hopes of an
outright acquittal. As explained in Part II, most first-time DWI offenses
carry very modest maximum penalties of only a few months in jail. In
practice, most defendants who plead guilty to these charges will not
receive anywhere near the maximum sentence and will instead receive
only a fine or perhaps a few days in jail. For poor defendants-
particularly those who are lingering in jail because they could not afford
to post bail-pleading guilty would result in a sentence of time served
and an immediate exit from jail.12 0 Such a plea bargain is obviously very
desirable.
Moreover, for indigent defendants who are either unemployed or
work in low-skill jobs, the collateral consequences of being a convicted
misdemeanant are not significant. It is very unlikely that they will be
fired from their jobs because they now have a misdemeanor conviction
on their records. Indeed, pleading guilty (and thus getting out of jail)
will help them to avoid being fired for being absent from work. And
with respect to future employment, a misdemeanor conviction will not
prevent indigent individuals from attaining the types of jobs-laboring
jobs or low-paying service jobs-that they likely would seek in the future.
Thus, for indigent defendants there is little disincentive to plea bargain
DWI cases and forego a trial.
Middle- and upper-class DWI defendants face a much different
calculus. First, for an affluent defendant, this will likely be his first run-in
with the criminal justice system and the prospect of spending even a few
days in jail may be scary enough to gamble on a trial in the hopes of an
outright acquittal. Second, and more importantly, even if the affluent
defendant were offered a plea bargain with only a fine or a very short jail
sentence, the collateral consequences of a conviction might be too
significant to allow him to accept an otherwise attractive plea bargain
offer.121 A conviction on the affluent DWI defendant's record might
prevent her from being admitted to the law school or medical school of
her choice.'22 It might prevent the individual from being hired for a
120. See, e.g., Lise Olsen, Thousands Languish in Crowded Jail: Inmates Can Stay Locked Up for
More than a Year Waiting for Trial in Low-Level Crimes, Hous. CHRON. (Aug. 23, 2009, 11:53 AM),
hpp://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/6583478.html (finding that 200 inmates currently
incarcerated in the Harris County jail already had served the minimum jail sentence for the crimes
they were charged with).
121. See Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity
of Punishment Revisited, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 721, 723 (1989) ("[A] felony conviction with a suspended
sentence would generally ruin the career of a physician, but it might be of little consequence to an
unskilled laborer without strong community ties.").
122. See John S. Dzienkowski, Character and Fitness Inquiries in Law School Admissions, 45 S.
TEx. L. REv. 921, 923 (2004) (explaining that a majority of law schools ask applicants character and
fitness questions and that "most of the questions relate primarily to criminal offenses as well as those
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desirable job that has many other applicants (none of whom have been
convicted of a crime). The conviction might even ruin an individual's
political aspirations or standing in the community. For these reasons,
affluent defendants have reason to turn down attractive plea bargain
offers and to gamble on going to trial.
If they are smart, affluent defendants do not gamble on going to
trial with just any lawyer. Instead, they hire DWI specialists. Every
major city has DWI defense specialists. 12 3 These lawyers devote almost
their entire practices to DWI defense. They are often former
prosecutors who handled DWI cases while in the district attorney's
office. They know the ins and outs of how the breathalyzer machines
work and every argument - some genuine and others facetious - that can
be raised to cast aspersion on such devices. They have cross-examined
hundreds of police officers and can raise myriad questions impugning
their training generally and their handling of sobriety tests in particular.
Experienced DWI defense lawyers are in a position to put the police
departments and breathalyzers on trial, thus raising numerous avenues
for jurors to find reasonable doubt to acquit.
By contrast, many of the prosecutors handling DWI cases will be
ambitious and hardworking but inexperienced. Because most DWI cases
are low-level misdemeanors and it is well known that it is harder to
convince jurors to convict in DWI cases, many district attorneys' offices
assign such cases to junior prosecutors. In Houston, Texas, where the
author has taught criminal procedure to dozens of entry-level
prosecutors, most have gone on to litigate a DWI case as their first (and
often their second and third) trial after joining the district attorney's
office. Anecdotally, these junior prosecutors report being out-matched
by the experienced DWI defense lawyers who they faced at trial.
Of course, if the evidence is overwhelming and the defendant is on
video getting out of the car drunk and falling over, the quality of the
lawyers will be irrelevant. Even the best defense lawyers cannot perform
magic. But those cases rarely proceed to trial because DWI defense
specialists can typically convince their clients to plea bargain when they
have no plausible chance of prevailing at trial.
The real question is what happens in the closer cases. For instance,
what is the result at trial when the defendant's breathalyzer reading was
.12 in a jurisdiction that sets the legal limit at .08? Or what is the
outcome when the defendant refused to take a breathalyzer test and all
the prosecutor has to work with is a grainy police video and the
testimony of officers that the defendant failed the walk-and-turn test or
related to applicants' prior educational history"). Additionally, the prospect of a DWI conviction
could cause an individual to worry about being admitted to the bar following law school.
123. A Google search of "DWI" and the name of any medium or large city brings up dozens of
webpages for attorneys specializing in DWI.
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the other field sobriety tests? In these cases, a top defense lawyer can
effectively raise doubts in the jury's mind. For instance, the defense
lawyers may lead a jury to believe that the .12 breathalyzer reading was
inaccurate because the machine had not been calibrated immediately
before the test was administered, even if such calibration is not legally
required. If the main evidence against the defendant is a police officer's
testimony that the defendant failed field sobriety tests, a skilled defense
lawyer may convince jurors that the field sobriety tests were inaccurate
because the defendant was wearing dress shoes instead of sneakers or
because overhead street lights were too distracting.124
Of course, in some cases these arguments might be genuine. Police
occasionally do fail to perform sobriety tests properly.125 But in other
cases, talented defense attorneys can convince juries to acquit through
baseless challenges to the evidence. For instance, DWI defense
specialists might be able to convince jurors that breathalyzer machines
are never accurate or that field sobriety tests such as the one-leg stand or
the walk-and-turn test cannot be trusted. In support of their claims, they
may cite to isolated studies that are complete outliers from the other
scientific literature, or studies that are outdated.126  DWI defense
specialists will often also present testimony from their own expert
witnesses to attack the prosecution's case.127
This is not to say that jurors are stupid and gullible or that some
trial judges would not fall for the same tactics. I also do not mean to
suggest that DWI defense lawyers are unethical. They are vigorously
defending their clients by raising every possible argument that could
amount to reasonable doubt. The reality, however, is that trial judges
who have seen hundreds of DWI cases will not be swayed by weak
arguments. Trial judges who have presided over numerous DWI cases
would certainly have heard of studies casting doubt on the accuracy of
breathalyzer machines and field sobriety tests. But they also would be
aware of the far more numerous and scientifically accepted studies that
demonstrate the accuracy of the tests.2 8 Put differently, trial judges with
considerable background knowledge (unlike jurors who are likely
124. See, e.g., People v. Schaefer, 516 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (Yonkers City Ct. 1987) (noting cases in
which doubts concerning the effectiveness of the breathalyzer were raised and giving the defendant
the benefit of the doubt).
125. See, e.g., id. at 394 (noting that the breathalyzer had not been calibrated in six months).
126. See, e.g., MARCELLINE BURNS & HERBERT MOSKOWITZ, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., PUB. No. DOT HS-802 424, PSYCHOPHYSICAL TESTS FOR DWI ARREST 1 (1977) (finding a
76% accuracy rate with a "high rate of false-arrest decisions").
127. See Gil Sapir & Mark Giangrande, Right to Inspect and Test Breath Alcohol Machines:
Suspicion Ain't Proof, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 26 (1999) ("Expert witness testimony is essential to
establishing an effective defense against the per se drunk driving charge.").
128. See, e.g., MARCELLINE BURNS & TERESA DIOQUINo, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., A FLORIDA VALIDATION STUDY OF THE STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TEST (S.F.S.T.)
BATTERY 31 (1997) (concluding that officers' decisions to arrest based on field sobriety tests were
accurate in 95% of cases).
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hearing their first DWI case) will not have to rely on prosecutors to
debunk the thin arguments made by DWI defense specialists. And that
is important because many junior prosecutors handling DWI cases are
inexperienced and lack the time and foresight to counter all the
arguments that DWI defense specialists will raise.
In sum, DWI defense specialists will have a harder time dazzling (or
confusing) trial judges and raising reasonable doubt.12 9 Eliminating juries
from misdemeanor DWI trials will therefore lead to outcomes that are
based more on the evidence and less on the quality of lawyers handling
the cases.
2. Jurors Likely Have More Compassion for DWI Defendants than
Judges
A second reason why juries are more likely to acquit DWI
defendants is simple compassion and a sense of, "There but for the grace
of God go I."x1o
To be selected for jury duty in most jurisdictions, prospective jurors
must have clean records and no felony convictions.13' Ordinarily, this
helps the prosecution because a panel of law-abiding citizens who have
rarely, if ever, gotten into trouble with the law stands in judgment of a
defendant who is charged with offensive behavior and who jurors usually
believe is not "one of them." While jurors hopefully give the defendant a
fair shake and refuse to convict unless the evidence is compelling, in
most cases it is unlikely that law-abiding jurors will place a thumb on the
scales of justice to give the defendant an extra edge. 13 2 Put simply, when
presented with a defendant charged with murder, rape, theft, or a host of
other offenses, most jurors would have trouble saying to themselves,
"There but for the grace of God go I."
Once again, the dynamic in DWI cases is quite different. First,
although jurors in DWI cases are usually law-abiding citizens, the odds
are that many of them can see themselves in the defendant's shoes.
Many jurors have driven an automobile after consuming at least some
alcohol.'33 A smaller number of jurors may be heavier drinkers who have
actually driven while intoxicated once or twice, yet simply have not been
129. See Posner, supra note 7, at 1491-92 ("Trial by jury also magnifies differences in ability
between opposing counsel" and it permits "the unscrupulous mastery of deceitful rhetorical tricks.").
130. See ROBIN, supra note 3, at 7.
131. See Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 67
(2003).
132. There are exceptions. For instance, there has been a push toward jury nullification in some
communities. See PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A Hip-Hop THEORY OF JUSTICE 68-71 (2009).
133. See JACOBS, supra note 21, at 44 (discussing a study in which 37% of 1491 adults over
eighteen admitted to driving after consuming alcohol). The percentage is likely higher because
respondents are often unwilling to admit stigmatic behavior in surveys.
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caught.1" And another group of jurors-perhaps as high as ten percent
of the population-can be termed "problem drinkers," many of whom
will have driven while intoxicated multiple times."' While none of these
jurors would applaud drunk driving, in the back of their minds they may
be willing to show leniency given that they have committed (or have
come close to committing) the same offense themselves.
Second, some jurors who have never driven after ingesting alcohol
will nevertheless look at DWI charges through the lens of their own
personal traffic stops. Most jurors have been stopped by the police for
basic traffic offenses at one time or another in their lives.'16 Many have
received traffic tickets for speeding, failure to signal, or running a stop
sign. A substantial number of jurors may believe that officers treated
them unfairly with respect to such traffic offenses. They may believe that
they were not really speeding as fast as the officer contended or that,
regardless, they were still driving safely and did not deserve a ticket.
Thus, even jurors who have no personal experience with DWI may
distrust the power and judgment exercised by police with respect to
traffic infractions generally. In turn, this may make them more
compassionate to DWI defendants and less likely to convict.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, jurors in DWI cases can look
over at the defense table and see someone who looks remarkably like
themselves."' Unlike most offenses in the criminal code that are
committed by a disreputable group of people who "are not like me,"
DWI is a crime committed by the entire spectrum of society, including
many middle-class people.3 8
Of course, there are many crimes that are committed by mainstream
people. Lots of middle-class Americans, for instance, violate the law by
possessing and ingesting marijuana and other illegal drugs.'39 Yet, it is
often difficult for law enforcement to detect this wrongdoing among the
middle class and bring criminal charges against them. As Professor Bill
134. Id. at 43 ("A second category, perhaps amounting to 15 percent of all drivers, comprises
heavy social drinkers who sometimes may be on the road at illegal BACs.").
135. Id. ("Ten percent of all drivers are problem drinkers, whose drinking patterns are likely to
bring them frequently into conflict with the DWI laws.").
136. Each year there are nearly thirty million traffic stops in the United States. See, e.g., ERICA
LEAH SCHMrIT ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. NCJ
191548, CHARACTERISTICS OF DRIVERS STOPPED BY POLICE, 1999, at 1, 4 (2002), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.
gov/content/pub/pdf/cdsp99.pdf (noting that in 1999 more than 10% of all licensed drivers were
stopped by police).
137. See John Clark, The Social Psychology of Jury Nullification, 24 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 39,
48-49 (2000) (explaining how jurors who acquitted Lyle and Eric Menendez could not believe that
they killed their parents because they "looked like nice young men").
138. See JACOBS, supra note 21, at xxi ("[D]runk driving is not a crime associated with the poor
and dispossessed. According to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCRs), drunk drivers have the
highest percentage of white offenders (90 percent) of any arrest group.").
139. Sana Loue, The Criminalization of the Addictions, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 281, 307 (2003) ("It has
been estimated that approximately 32% to 46% of the United States population over the age of 12 has
used marijuana at least once; approximately 5% are regular users.").
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Stuntz has explained, constitutional privacy protection is often unequally
distributed in favor of the wealthy.140 Affluent individuals can commit
drug offenses from the privacy of their heavily Fourth Amendment-
protected homes and are unlikely to face arrest and prosecution. 4 ' Thus,
when juries look to the defense table in drug cases they are less likely to
see people like them. The same is not true of DWI offenses, which by
their very nature are committed in public. Because there are so many
traffic offenses in the criminal code and automobiles receive very limited
Fourth Amendment protection, it is quite easy for police to pull over and
arrest not just the poor, but also the middle class and the wealthy for
DWI offenses.142
And once arrested, wealthy DWI defendants-unlike poor
defendants-have the incentive and financial ability to go to trial. As
explained in Part IV.B.1 above, affluent defendants may have a greater
aversion to prison than poor defendants, and the collateral consequences
of pleading guilty on school admissions and career prospects may make
them more likely to gamble on going to trial. And, of course, affluent
defendants have the money to hire the best DWI defense lawyers to
handle their cases at trial.
In sum, when jurors look over to the defense table in DWI trials,
they are likely to see a middle- or upper-class individual who holds a
respectable job, has never been in trouble with the law before, and looks
very much like the jurors themselves. This, in turn, raises two questions.
First, will jurors who identify with defendants be less likely to convict?
And second, would judges-who also can identify with middle-class or
affluent defendants-be immune from that temptation?
The first question seems fairly easy to answer. Individuals typically
are willing to give the benefit of the doubt to those with whom they
identify. Social scientists have found that trust correlates with race,
ethnicity, and income level.143
The second question is harder to answer. Do judges have a better
ability to put aside their sympathies and compassion for those whom they
identify with so that they can convict guilty defendants? There are a
number of reasons to think the answer is yes. First, almost all judges are
trained lawyers who have been socialized to look at problems with a
focus on logic and analysis. This is not to say that lawyers are always
able to compartmentalize their biases and their compassion to
sympathetic individuals. But their analytical legal training would seem to
140. See Stuntz, supra note 116, at 1821-24.
141. See id. at 1824.
142. See Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: Determinacy
Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 Miss. L.J. 341, 393 (2004) ("No one disputes
the proposition that full compliance with all traffic regulations is impossible for any significant
distance.").
143. See Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1534 (2005) (discussing literature).
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make them more likely to avoid such biases than jurors who have not
necessarily received such training. Second, and more importantly, judges
who have presided over many trials often become desensitized. After
one hundred DWI trials, a judge is less likely to see the defendant as an
individual from the same social and economic class, and more likely to
look at her as a cog in the machine. Once the judge fails to see the
defendant as an individual who looks like him, the disincentive to convict
diminishes.14
In sum, there are a number of reasons-including personal drinking
history, prior traffic tickets, and identification with middle-class
defendants-that likely make jurors more compassionate toward DWI
defendants and less likely to convict. Judges certainly face the same
biases, but because of legal training and a long history of handling DWI
cases, they likely are better able to set aside those biases that would favor
defendants.
3. Juries Are More Likely to Acquit Because They Are Unaware of the
Punishment that Will Be Imposed on DWI Offenders
In virtually every aspect of the criminal justice process, juries
possess far less information than judges.145 In the DWI context, one
important information deficit is punishment ranges and likely sentences.
The average juror probably has no idea what the punishment range is for
first-time offenders and, more importantly, what actual sentence is likely
to be imposed within that range if the defendant is convicted. As
explained below, this lack of information may lead jurors to acquit a
guilty defendant out of unjustified fear that the defendant would receive
a long prison sentence.
Most first-time DWI defendants face relatively short maximum
sentences of a few months in jail, or even less.'" Yet, outsiders who do
not work in the criminal justice system-those most likely to end up as
jurors-may mistakenly believe otherwise.147 Over the last few decades,
advocates such as MADD have vigorously campaigned to stamp out
144. Cf Janet A. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The
Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1083, 1124 (1991) ("Judges try hundreds, even
thousands of cases every year, while jurors hear only a few during their service. Over and over again,
the juvenile court judge hears testimony from the same police and probation officers, inevitably
forming a settled opinion on their credibility. Worse yet, the judge may well have heard earlier
charges against the accused, and thus may come to hold a fixed view on the juvenile's credibility and
character."). While Professor Ainsworth identifies the same data point as me, she reaches the
opposite conclusion. She maintains that, in the juvenile context, judges' familiarity with the types of
cases makes them worse fact-finders because they become less meticulous. See id.
145. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 911, 920-29 (2006) (discussing the informational "gulf' between criminal justice insiders and
outsiders).
146. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
147. See Bibas, supra note 145, at 913 ("Public information about criminal justice is notoriously
inaccurate and outdated . . . .").
984 [Vol. 2011
ELIMINATING JURY TRIALS FOR DRUNK DRIVING
drunk driving. Due to these legislative efforts and the accompanying
public informational campaign, many jurors may wrongly assume that
the statutory penalties for DWI are more severe than they actually are.
In fact, social scientists have found that law-abiding citizens, such as
those who would serve on juries, tend to overestimate the severity of
penalties authorized for criminal defendants. 4 8 Worse yet, the law
generally forbids lawyers from correcting such misperceptions by
discussing possible sentences during the guilt phase of trials.14 9
More importantly, the maximum sentences are actually deceiving to
criminal justice outsiders because most first-time offenders do not
receive anywhere close to the maximums.1"0 Despite statutory maximum
sentences of six months or longer, most defendants convicted of first-
time DWI receive no jail time whatsoever." t And, of course, prosecutors
and defense lawyers are absolutely forbidden from informing jurors
during the guilt stage of a trial that the defendant likely will not receive
anywhere close to the maximum sentence. 15 2
As jurors sit through the guilt stage of a DWI trial, they are either
uninformed about the defendant's possible sentence or, if they are aware
of the maximum sentence and believe the defendant might receive it,
misinformed about what punishment the defendant likely will receive.
This, in turn, likely makes it harder for jurors to convict DWI
defendants. Imagine that our DWI defendant is a sympathetic young
college student who has never been in trouble with the law before.' He
is neatly dressed and looks as though he would never harm a soul. His
parents are sitting in the front row of the courtroom and they look
148. See Raymond Paternoster et al., Assessment of Risk and Behavioral Experience: An
Exploratory Study of Change, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 417, 418 (1985) ("[P]rior research has suggested that
most people perceive potential legal penalties to be more severe than they actually are and, compared
with offending populations, nonoffenders generally overestimate the presumptive severity of legal
penalties.").
149. See Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 721, 734 (2005) ("Courts keep juries in the dark about punishments, forbid lawyers to
mention them, and instruct juries not to think about them."); Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant
After All? A Prescription for Informing Juries About the Consequences of Conviction, B.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1548654.
150. Although this evidence largely is anecdotal, based on conversations with prosecutors and
defense attorneys around the country, its validity can be seen in some published opinions, as well. See,
e.g., Garcia v. State, 296 S.W.3d 180, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (upholding conviction where
defendant was sentenced to three days in jail for DWI, which is a class B misdemeanor in Texas
carrying a maximum sentence of up to 180 days' incarceration).
151. See Cafaro, supra note 28, at 9 ("A first time [drunk driving] offender generally receives
probation, a fine, some form of alcohol counseling and some form of driver's education schooling.").
152. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 89 S.W.3d 843, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (reversing a
sentence in part when the prosecutor told the jury that "[t]here's a very important reason [why you
should sentence the defendant to ten years] but legally I'm not allowed to tell you" because such
argument invited speculation and was improper).
153. Although many DWI offenders are older, college-age men are common DWI defendants, as
well. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB.
No. ED295017, DRUNK DRIVING 1 (1988) (finding that "[a]rrest rates for DUI were highest among 21-
year-olds").
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anguished at the prospect of their child going to jail. The evidence fairly
clearly indicates that our defendant is guilty: police officers testified that
he stumbled while walking and that he blew a .13 on the breathalyzer in a
jurisdiction that sets the legal limit at .08. He is by all rights guilty of the
crime, but jurors might be very reluctant to send a nice young man who
has made a single mistake to jail for weeks or months or even longer.
There is, therefore, an incentive for at least one juror to discount the
evidence and vote not guilty so that a stiff punishment is not meted out.m4
By virtue of having far less information about sentencing realities, jurors
may be less willing to convict sympathetic defendants out of fear of
excessive punishment."'
Now imagine instead that the same case is tried before a judge who
has full knowledge of the sentencing range and typical punishments.
While the judge may have empathy toward the young defendant and
hate to see him sent to jail, the judge will be unlikely to acquit the
defendant as a result of that empathy. Instead, the judge will recognize
that even if convicted, the defendant will likely receive probation or, at
most, a few days in jail. Because that same judge will be in charge of
sentencing the defendant, she need not worry that convicting the
defendant will open him up to a long and horrible jail sentence that is
beyond her control as the trier of fact. Indeed, given that the judge
controls sentencing, she might be even more willing to convict, knowing
that she can mitigate any damage to the defendant by imposing a light
sentence. In short, the judge's superior knowledge about what will
happen at the next stage of the criminal justice process helps her to avoid
acquitting sympathetic (but nonetheless factually guilty) defendants.
4. Juries Are More Likely to Acquit Because They Are Not Subject to
Pressure from Interest Groups
In addition to possessing less information, jurors also differ from
judges because their participation in the criminal justice process is
fleeting and largely anonymous. Because jurors are present for only a
154. For this reason, social scientists have found that increases in the severity of drunk driving
laws have sometimes had the unintended effect of reducing conviction rates because juries and judges
are unwilling to impose penalties they view as unjustified. See H. LAURENCE Ross, DETERRING THE
DRINKING DRIVER: LEGAL POLICY AND SOCIAL CONTROL 95-97 (1982).
155. Critics might object that jurors' lack of knowledge about punishment is true for most crimes,
not just DWI offenses. Although that is true, and jurors might be afraid of overpunishment for a
handful of other low-level offenses, for most crimes jurors will not be likely to acquit out of concern
for overpunishment. For example, it is difficult to imagine a juror refusing to convict of murder, rape,
or even theft, because of fear that the defendant might be sentenced to prison as a result. Moreover,
even if the nullification problem exists with respect to other crimes, singling out DWI trials to
eliminate jury trials is still defendable because it is one of the, if not the, most commonly tried crime(s)
in the criminal code. See Kelsey P. Black, Undue Protection Versus Undue Punishment: Examining the
Drinking and Driving Problem Across the United States, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 463, 463 (2006)
("Drunk driving is the nation's most commonly perpetrated violent crime.").
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single trial and will almost never be in the public view, there are usually
no repercussions if jurors fail to convict in a case where the evidence was
strong. Except in the highest-profile cases-which DWI cases surely are
not-jurors who vote to acquit will return to their lives without any
stigma or adverse career effects. There is little outside pressure imposed
on jurors to encourage them to convict. By contrast, judges may face
considerable outside pressure from interest groups to convict DWI
defendants.
In most jurisdictions, sitting judges must stand for re-election."6
This is not ordinarily a problem for judges because re-election rates are
very high.1 17  The public is almost never aware of who particular trial
judges are, and they are even less informed about which cases judges
have presided over and what rulings they have issued. Thus, if a trial
judge keeps her head down and does not make any waves, she generally
does not have to worry about how her rulings will affect her re-election
prospects.
There is an exception to this general rule, though, when interest
groups want to pressure judges not to rule too leniently in favor of
defendants."' The story plays out like this: if a judge makes rulings in
DWI cases that are too pro-defendant-for instance, suppressing
breathalyzer tests or imposing extremely light sentences-the
prosecutors who work in that court might call the local MADD
representative. 9 MADD will then dispatch an observer to sit in the
judge's courtroom during DWI trials to observe how the judge is
handling the cases. If the judge continues to behave in a way that seems
to overly advantage the defendant, MADD may then decide to target the
judge when she seeks re-election. And MADD is a powerful interest
group with a large number of members. Given how low the turnout is
for judicial elections, an opposition campaign by MADD could be
extremely detrimental to a sitting judge. Of course, it may not come to
that because when the judge sees the MADD representative in the
courtroom, she may (perhaps subconsciously) adjust her behavior to be
less favorable to DWI defendants.
156. See Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REv. 283, 328
(2008) ("[Jludges at all levels are popularly elected in the vast majority of states.").
157. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62
U. CHi. L. REv. 689, 741 (1995) (noting that incumbent judges are usually re-elected).
158. See Leigh Goodmark, Telling Stories, Saving Lives: The Battered Mothers' Testimony Project,
Women's Narratives, and Court Reform, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 709, 752-53 (2005) (explaining how
advocates against domestic violence and other problems can influence judges' behavior by being
present in court and noting "the influence that Mothers Against Drunk Driving has had in pressuring
judges to sentence drunk drivers severely"); Lynn Hecht Schafran, There's No Accounting for Judges,
58 ALB. L. REv. 1063, 1079 (1995) (describing "court watching" and "MADD's critical role in forcing
judges to sentence drunk drivers with the severity they deserve").
159. MADD's website reveals not only contact information for the national office but also
contacts at state and county levels. See Local Offices, MADD, http://www.madd.org/local-offices/ (last
visited Mar. 19, 2011).
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While judges are supposed to be completely immune from political
pressure, they are human. Judges typically enjoy their jobs and will
likely be willing to adjust their behavior at the margins in order to
eliminate threats to their re-election. In the DWI context, that may
translate into judges being more likely to convict. Jurors, of course, face
no such political pressure."
In sum, both empirical and qualitative analyses indicate that judges
are more likely to convict defendants in DWI cases. As the next Part
describes, a higher conviction rate in DWI cases will result in a greater
certainty of punishment, which will in turn improve general deterrence.
V. ELIMINATING JURY TRIALS FOR CERTAIN DWI CASES SHOULD
IMPROVE DETERRENCE AND SAVE RESOURCES
Criminologists have devoted considerable energy over the last few
decades to studying which efforts actually reduce crime. Many experts
would be quick to caution that we simply do not know enough to draw
firm conclusions about what deters.'61 Nevertheless, it is widely agreed
that the severity of punishment-the variable on which legislatures most
often fixatel6-is ineffective' at enhancing deterrence." By contrast,
160. Jurors could face psychological pressure to convict if they saw the MADD representative
sitting in the courtroom and recognized why she was there. It would be difficult for jurors to know
that a MADD representative was present, however, because identifying information, such as buttons
or posters, is typically forbidden during jury trials. See Sierra Elizabeth, The Newest Spectator Sport:
Why Extending Victims' Rights to the Spectators' Gallery Erodes the Presumption of Innocence, 58
DUKE L.J. 275 (2008) (cataloging cases and arguing against any retreat from the general prohibition in
the face of the victims' rights movement); see also State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449, 454-55 (W. Va.
1985) (overturning conviction after ten to thirty members of MADD sat in the courtroom directly in
front of the jury wearing large MADD buttons). Judges need not see a button to know that the person
in the front row is a MADD representative. Court staff, prosecutors, or defense lawyers could easily
signal to the judge that MADD is watching.
161. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The
Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 181-82 (2008)
("Empirical evidence on the deterrent effects of punishment remains speculative and inconclusive, and
the ability of formal punishment alone to deter crime appears to be quite limited.").
162. See, e.g., Jerome S. Legge, Jr. & Joonghoon Park, Policies to Reduce Alcohol-Impaired
Driving: Evaluating Elements of Deterrence, 75 Soc. Sci. Q. 594, 603 (1994) ("Virtually all citizens are
against the 'drunk driver,' and the greater the penalties against this individual, the better it should be
for society. This helps explain the rush to the severity approach which many states took to deter
alcohol-impaired driving early on."); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REv. 505, 509 (2001) ("Voters demand harsh treatment of criminals; politicians respond with
tougher sentences . . . .").
163. See Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the
Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 187 (2003) (reviewing the leading studies examining severity
of punishment and deterrence and concluding that "[w]e could find no conclusive evidence that
supports the hypothesis that harsher sentences reduce crime through the mechanism of general
deterrence"); Legge & Park, supra note 162, at 596 ("The use of higher fines and especially jail terms
has been disappointing on the whole [in deterring drunk driving]."); Raymond Paternoster & Leeann
lovanni, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity: A Reexamination, 64 Soc. FORCEs 751, 769 (1986)
("Our data suggest only the more narrow conclusion that perceived severity has no direct and
immediate effect on the commission of minor offenses."); H. Laurence Ross, The Scandinavian Myth:
The Effectiveness of Drinking-and-Driving Legislation in Sweden and Norway, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 285,
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social scientists have long found that increasing the perceived certainty of
punishment is effective at deterring misconduct. In addition to
improving the certainty of punishment, moving to a bench trial regime
will make the prosecution of DWI cases much shorter and more efficient.
There is some evidence that enhancing the celerity or swiftness of
punishment will also improve general deterrence. But even setting aside
a celerity effect, eliminating jury trials in DWI cases will result in other
efficiency gains that will improve the criminal justice process. Section A
therefore discusses the prospect of improved deterrence, and Section B
reviews the efficiency gains to be had from eliminating jury trials in
certain DWI cases.
A. Certainty of Punishment Is the Most Effective Deterrent
Over the last few decades, social scientists have demonstrated that
the perceived certainty of punishment-that is, the likelihood of being
caught and held responsible for criminal behavior-is the single most
important variable in deterring misconduct. Studies have demonstrated
this to be true for crime generally' 5 and for DWI offenses in particular.1*
286 (1975) (utilizing interrupted time-series analysis but failing to find support for the conventional
wisdom that more punitive DWI laws in Sweden, Norway, and Finland have been more effective at
deterring drunk driving).
164. There are exceptions. See, e.g., Klepper & Nagin, supra note 121, at 741 ("[Olur findings
suggest that both the certainty and severity of punishment are deterrents, whereas prior findings
generally suggest that only the former is an effective deterrent."). Although severity is typically
discounted by social scientists, some scholars have argued that severity of punishment can be an
effective deterrent when there are sufficiently high levels of perceived certainty of punishment. See
Harold G. Grasmick & George J. Bryjak, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of Punishment, 59
Soc. FORCES 471, 471 (1980) (contending that many studies discounting the severity of punishment
failed to consider the interaction between certainty and severity of punishment). Nevertheless, the
bulk of the literature concludes that severity is not an effective deterrent.
165. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY:
AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 47 (1999) (reviewing the literature and concluding that "there
are consistent and significant negative correlations between likelihood of conviction and crime rates");
Robert Apel & Daniel S. Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of Recent Evidence, in HANDBOOK ON
CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Michael Tonry ed.) (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 2) (on file with
author) ("There is substantial evidence from a diverse literature that increases in the certainty of
punishment substantially deters criminal behavior."); Alfred Blumstein & Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent
Effect of Legal Sanctions on Draft Evasion, 29 STAN. L. REV. 241, 269 (1977) (studying draft evasion
and finding a significant negative association between the probability of conviction and the draft
evasion rate, leading the authors to conclude that their "findings are consistent with the work of other
investigators who have argued that the certainty of punishment has a stronger deterrent effect on
crime than the severity of punishment"); Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521, 544-47 (1973) (finding that the certainty
of punishment was a more important indicator than severity in deterring murder, rape, and robbery);
Grasmick & Bryjak, supra note 164, at 472 (reviewing twelve deterrence studies and explaining that
"nearly all these researchers conclude that perceived certainty of legal sanctions is a deterrent, [while]
only one (Kraut) concludes that perceptions of the severity of punishment are part of the social
control process"); Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty v. Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297, 304
(1991) (studying California arrestees and concluding that "increased certainty of punishment provides
a much more effective deterrent than increased severity" and that a "six percentage point increase in
average conviction rates would deter as many arrests as a 3.6 month increase in average prison
No. 3] 989
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
While the deterrence literature is vast, a few studies merit special
attention.
In 1967, Great Britain enacted the British Road Safety Act to tackle
the DWI problem. 7  The Act did not increase the severity of
punishment for those convicted of DWI and in fact most defendants
received no jail time if convicted under the new Act.'6 The Act did,
however, redefine the crime of drunk driving by making it a crime to
drive with a blood alcohol level in excess of .08.'6 The Act made it easier
for police to conduct breath tests and impose fines for refusing to comply
with breath test requests. 0 Importantly, the enactment of the law was
accompanied by enormous publicity, and "[kinowledge of the breath test
was nearly universal among adults in Britain.""' As a result of the Act,
police charged drunk driving more frequently and "there was a great
increase in the number of charges of drinking and driving offenses after
1967 that resulted in convictions." 172 In sum, the British Road Safety Act
increased the certainty, though not the severity, of punishment for drunk
driving.
The dramatic change in British law permitted sociologist Laurence
Ross to conduct an interrupted time-series analysis of accident data to
determine whether the Road Safety Act reduced drunk driving.173
Professor Ross found that the publicity of the Act and the increased
likelihood of being convicted in fact led to a sharp decrease in highway
casualties.174 In summarizing his findings, Ross explained that "the Road
Safety Act of 1967 provides support for the hypothesis that subjective
sentences"); Klepper & Nagin, supra note 121, at 741 (surveying graduate students about tax evasion
scenarios and finding that certainty of punishment is an effective deterrent); Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal
Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 13 (1998)
(reviewing the literature and concluding, inter alia, that "cross-sectional and scenario-based studies
have consistently found that perceptions of the risk of detection and punishment have negative,
deterrent-like associations with self-reported offending or intentions to offend"); Daniel S. Nagin &
Greg Pogarsky, An Experimental Investigation of Deterrence: Cheating, Self-Serving Bias, and
Impulsivity, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 167 (2003) (testing whether students would cheat on a trivia quiz in
order to earn a cash bonus and finding that cheating decreased when the certainty of detection was
higher but not when the perceived severity of punishment increased); Ann Dryden Witte, Estimating
the Economic Model of Crime with Individual Data, 94 Q. J. ECON. 57, 79 (1980) (studying men
released from the North Carolina prison system and demonstrating that "a percentage increase in the
probability of being punished has a relatively larger effect on the number of arrests or convictions than
does a percentage increase in the expected sentence").
166. See Ross, supra note 26, at 67-73 (reviewing international and domestic studies and
concluding that "there is considerable evidence that increasing the actual certainty of punishment for
drunk drivers in ways that also ensure adequate publicity can effect reductions in drunk driving").
167. See H. Laurence Ross, Law, Science, and Accidents: The British Road Safety Act of 1967, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1973).
168. Id. at 67-68.
169. Id. at 19.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 69.
172. Id. at 51.
173. Id. at 3.
174. Id.
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certainty of punishment can deter socially harmful behavior as
exemplified by drinking and driving in Great Britain.""'
In other research, Professor Ross found that the British experience
was consistent with DWI deterrence studies from around the globe.
Summarizing the literature in 1986, Professor Ross concluded that, "at
commonly prevailing levels of punitive severity, increments in threatened
certainty of punishment are able to produce increments in marginal
deterrence."'7  Ross went on to explain that "a chief source of difficulty
for deterrence-based interventions in the past has been the very low level
of actual and hence perceived certainty of punishment for offenders,"
and that "policymakers should be encouraged to increase certainty,
within the limits of political feasibility, by devoting the maximum of law-
enforcement resources to the problem, in focused ways." 77 Similarly, in
a study following the implementation of random breath testing in
Australia, a researcher found that the increased certainty of punishment
improved deterrence of drunk driving."'7
More recently, in a 2001 study, Daniel Nagin and Greg Pogarsky
surveyed college students about drinking and driving in an effort to
gauge the importance of certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment in
deterring offenders."'7  After describing a scenario in which students were
drinking on the main strip of a college town and believed themselves to
be legally intoxicated, Nagin and Pogarsky asked the students to estimate
the chances that they would be apprehended and convicted if they drove
home.1" The researchers then randomly assigned the subjects different
punishments ranging from a three-month license suspension to a fifteen-
month license suspension.'"' Having set out variables as to the certainty
and severity of punishment, Nagin and Pogarsky asked the students to
estimate the likelihood that they would drive home while legally
175. Id.
176. H. Laurence Ross, Implications of Drinking-and-Driving Law Studies for Deterrence Theory,
in CRITIQUE AND EXPLANATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GWYNNE NETELER 159, 166 (Timothy F.
Hartnagel & Robert A. Silverman eds., 1986) (emphasis omitted).
177. Id. at 168. For an earlier review of the literature, see Ross, supra note 154.
178. See Ross HOMEL, POLICING AND PUNISHING THE DRINKING DRIVER: A STUDY OF
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC DETERRENCE 236-37 (1988). Homel also found that those who believed the
penalty for drunk driving had increased became less likely to drive while intoxicated. Id. at 237.
However, he attributed the effectiveness of increased severity of punishment to the possibility that
"perceived severity of penalties only has predictive power when the perceived chances of arrest are
high." Id.
179. See Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal
Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865,
874-75 (2001).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 875.
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intoxicated.18 Once again, the researchers found that certainty of
punishment had a greater effect on deterrence than severity.'**
Interestingly, Nagin and Pogarsky went beyond the
certainty/severity question to examine the extralegal effects on
deterrence. Students were told that if they were represented by the
public defender their chance of escaping conviction was fifty percent.
They were also offered the option to hire an exceptional lawyer who
would "virtually assur[e]" them of not being convicted, or a "not as
good" lawyer who could arrange a plea bargain whereby the student
plead guilty to drunk driving but avoided any legal penalties." Students
were asked to state the maximum amount they would pay to each
lawyer."' This data enabled Nagin and Pogarsky to determine that the
students actually placed a greater monetary value on avoiding the stigma
of a conviction (even if it did not carry any punishment) than on avoiding
the actual legal consequences that typically accompanies a conviction.1 16
Put simply, Nagin and Pogarsky found that for college students accused
of DWI, the stigma of conviction, even without accompanying
punishment, amounted to an effective deterrent."
In these and other DWI studies,'" scholars have found that
increasing the certainty of punishment is effective at deterring drunk
driving. Following the logic of these studies, it stands to reason that
increasing the DWI conviction rate by moving from less-conviction-
prone jury trials to bench trials should improve the certainty of
punishment and hence the deterrent effect.
Of course, I do not want to overstate the case. Many DWI
offenders are never caught,8 9 and the social science evidence presented
to date primarily focuses on improving the certainty of apprehension
rather than the certainty of convicting those who have been
182. Id.
183. Id. at 883-84 ("It is in this sense that the results support the prediction that certainty effects
will be more pronounced than will be severity effects.").
184. Id. at 875-76.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 879.
187. As I discuss infra in Part VI.C, such a finding provides support for legislators carving out the
least serious DWI offenders (e.g., college students who are first-time offenders and have low blood
alcohol contents), eliminating the right to a jury trial, and punishing them with a maximum sentence of
a fine. For the right group of offenders, the stigma of conviction, even without an accompanying
threat of incarceration, can serve as an effective deterrent.
188. See Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, Enduring Individual Differences and Rational
Choice Theories of Crime, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 467,477,489 (1993) (using DWI scenarios (as well as
theft and sexual assault scenarios) and finding that "perceptions of the certainty of formal and
informal sanctions and self-imposed shame effectively controlled respondents' intentions to offend").
189. See Ross et al., supra note 1, at 163 ("The actual chances of apprehension for a drunk driver
in an American jurisdiction are estimated to range between 1 in 200 and 1 in 2000."); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal
Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1543 (1974) (discussing DWI arrests and fatalities and noting that, in
considering deterrence arguments, we must recognize that those figures "ignore[] all the instances of
drunken driving that did not lead to an arrest").
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apprehended. Thus, an increase in the conviction rate of those who are
arrested would not result in a drastic change in the number of DWI
offenders who are punished. Moreover, any discussion of deterring DWI
offenders must also recognize that, apart from the criminal
consequences, DWI offenders risk physical harm to themselves and
damage to their vehicles when they get behind the wheel. If these risks
do not create an adequate deterrent, there is reason to question whether
the criminal justice system can add much additional deterrence),o
Additionally, as Paul Robinson and John Darley have argued, changes in
legal rules often fail to improve deterrence because offenders often do
not know of the rules or are unable to rationally appreciate how the rules
will impact them.191
Because it is difficult to make credible deterrence predictions about
DWI'9-or any crime, for that matter-it would be inappropriate to
assert that eliminating jury trials definitely would lead to a marked
decrease in DWI offenses. Nevertheless, the social science literature
does suggest that judges will be more likely to convict DWI defendants,
and the deterrence literature in turn indicates that an increase in the
perceived certainty of punishment should have favorable deterrence
consequences. When the prospect of increased deterrence is considered
along with the celerity and efficiency benefits considered next in Section
B, the case for eliminating jury trials in misdemeanor DWI cases
becomes stronger.
B. Eliminating Jury Trials Improves the Celerity of Punishment and
Carries Other Efficiency Benefits
In addition to improving the certainty of punishment, legislation
eliminating the right to a jury trial for certain DWI charges would also
improve the celerity or swiftness of punishment. As discussed below,
there is evidence (albeit very limited at this time) that improving the
swiftness of punishment aids deterrence goals. Additionally, and
irrespective of whether deterrence is improved through swifter
punishment, moving to a bench trial regime will carry numerous
efficiency gains for the criminal justice system.
190. See Schulhofer, supra note 189, at 1543-44.
191. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 951 (2003) (expressing
"skepticism about the ability to deter crime through the manipulation of criminal law rules and
penalties").
192. See Ross et al., supra note 1, at 157 ("The empirical evidence for the deterrent effectiveness
of severe [DWI] penalties such as jail is, however, inconsistent at best.").
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1. Celerity of Punishment May Aid Deterrence
Punishment theorists have long posited that three factors-
certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment-are important in
maximizing deterrence. 93 As discussed in Section A, above, social
scientists have invested enormous attention in the certainty and severity
variables and have convincingly demonstrated that certainty of
punishment is by far the more important component of deterrence. As a
matter of logic, enhancing the celerity or swiftness of punishment would
seem likely to improve deterrence for the same reason that certainty of
punishment is important. When offenders are to be punished at some
abstract time in the distant future they may discount the punishment
rather than internalizing its full effect. By contrast, if punishment is
swift, defendants have less ability to ignore or minimize its impact.
Unfortunately, "empirical tests of the celerity effect are scant."194 And
those few studies that have been conducted fail to demonstrate
convincingly that swiftness of punishment furthers deterrence goals in
the way that the certainty of punishment studies do.'95
Despite the dearth of research on celerity effects, there is some
evidence in the DWI context to support the conventional wisdom that
swift punishment can have a positive effect on deterrence. During the
1980s, when breathalyzer tests became commonplace at traffic stops, a
few states imposed immediate license suspensions on drivers who either
failed or refused the breath tests. 196 Because the license revocations were
administrative in nature, they could be done very quickly and without the
standard due process guarantees that apply in criminal proceedings. At
the same time, even though the revocations were categorized as
administrative, individual drivers who had been deprived of their licenses
certainly felt as though they had been punished. The change in the law
to allow immediate license revocation provided researchers with the
opportunity to test whether the celerity of punishment had a deterrent
effect on traffic fatalities. In a New Mexico study, Professor Laurence
Ross found that a new law providing for immediate forfeiture of licenses
for drivers who failed or refused blood alcohol tests led to a drop in
driving-related fatalities involving drivers or pedestrians with blood
193. See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 55-57 (Henry Paolucci trans., The
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1963) (1764).
194. Nagin & Pogarsky, supra note 179, at 865.
195. See id. at 884 ("As for the celerity effect, further testing is necessary before it can be
confidently concluded that the impact of celerity is immaterial."); see also Edmund S. Howe &
Thomas C. Loftus, Integration of Certainty, Severity, and Celerity Information in Judged Deterrence
Value: Further Evidence and Methodological Equivalence, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 226, 227, 237
(1996) (noting that "celerity has been, with few exceptions... largely discounted and assumed
irrelevant to the subjective representation of punishment" and finding in a new study that "the
relevance of celerity information to judgment of deterrence value is at best minor").
196. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., HIGHWAY SAFETY
14 (1985) (reviewing efforts in eleven states).
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alcohol levels over .05.197 Studies in other states likewise found swift
license revocations to be effective deterrents."
Thus, although there is a dearth of research on the importance of
the celerity of punishment, there is at least some evidence to suggest that
carrying out swift justice in the DWI context serves to reduce drunk
driving.'" Of course, it would be folly to put too much importance on the
administrative license suspension data when predicting the deterrence
gains that would come from eliminating jury trials. As explained in
Section B.2 below, eliminating jury trials in DWI prosecutions would
almost certainly abbreviate the time from arrest to conviction. In many
instances, eliminating juries would lead some defendants to relinquish
their trial rights and quickly plead guilty instead. Yet, even in those
cases the time between arrest and conviction would still not be
immediate because there would be pretrial settings and other legal
wrangling before a conviction. And for defendants who do insist on a
bench trial, the new regime might provide that trial much faster, but
there would still be a considerable lag between the time of the offense
and the time of conviction. As such, while celerity of punishment would
be improved, it may still be too long of a time between offense and
conviction to foster an improvement in the deterrent effect. Put simply,
the case for an improved celerity effect on deterrence by eliminating jury
trial rights is possible, though not necessarily likely. Nevertheless, as
discussed below, the same efficiency gains that support the celerity
argument stand on their own as systemic improvements to the criminal
justice process.
197. See H. Laurence Ross, Administrative License Revocation in New Mexico: An Evaluation, 9
LAW & POL'Y 5, 13-14 (1987) ("Inasmuch as administrative license revocation may be viewed as
emphasizing swiftness of punishment, these results testify to the potential of this previously
unexamined variable in the deterrence proposition.").
198. See NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., PUB. No. SS-84/01, DETERRENCE OF DRUNK DRIVING: THE
ROLE OF SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE REVOCATIONS 20 (1984) (finding a
nearly 18% decrease in fatal alcohol-related traffic accidents in Delaware after the initiation of
sobriety checkpoints and administrative license revocations despite an 8% increase in fuel
consumption during the same time period); FORST LOWERY, MINNESOTA'S DOUBLE-BARRELLED
IMPLIED CONSENT LAW: A 1983 UPDATE OF "ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE LEGAL AND
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE MINNESOTA LAW ENTITLED 'CHEMICAL TEST FOR INTOXICATION"'
54-65 (1983), http://ntl.bts.gov/ib/25000/25600/25668/DOT-HS-806-549.pdf (discussing increased
perception of certainty of punishment from immediate license revocation and the decline in traffic
fatalities).
199. Outside the license revocation context, at least one study has found limited deterrent
improvement in DWI cases from increased celerity of punishment. See Jiang Yu, Punishment Celerity
and Severity: Testing a Specific Deterrence Model on Drunk Driving Recidivism, 22 J. CRIM. JUST. 355,
359, 362 (1994) (finding that celerity of punishment did play a role in maximizing deterrence of first-
time drunk-driving offenders, though also finding fines to be a more important factor).
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2. Eliminating Jury Trials Improves the Efficiency of the System
Drunk driving is the most commonly prosecuted misdemeanor
offense,2m and possibly the most commonly prosecuted of all criminal
offenses in the United States. Each year, police arrest nearly 1.5 million
people for DWI.201 The amount of resources required to conduct DWI
prosecutions in these cases is enormous. For cases that proceed to jury
trial, prosecutors must prepare witnesses and arguments, juries must be
empanelled, judges must preside, and most other work in those courts
will grind to a halt. Eliminating the right to a jury trial for first-offense
DWI prosecutions will substantially reduce the needed resources by
(1) eliminating the need for jurors, voir dire, and peremptory challenges;
(2) shortening the duration of trials because judges are in need of less
background information than juries; and (3) reducing the number of
trials altogether because defendants who face more conviction-prone
judges have lower odds of an acquittal at trial and thus less incentive to
risk the higher penalty that typically comes with a bench trial. All of
these efficiencies will enable prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys
to devote more of their time and attention to other (likely more serious)
criminal cases.
a. Efficiencies from Eliminating Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and Jurors
Eliminating the right to a jury trial would also eliminate some of the
most time-consuming aspects of pretrial procedure. With no jury trials,
there obviously would be no voir dire questioning. This, of course,
would save whatever time the court would have allotted for jury
selection. More importantly, though, eliminating voir dire saves lawyers'
time outside of court. Attorneys, particularly junior prosecutors
handling their first few trials, spend an enormous amount of time writing
and practicing a voir dire script they will use to weed out unfavorable
prospective jurors and win over favorable jurors before testimony begins.
Because many prosecutors cut their teeth on first-offense DWI
prosecutions, they likely spend large amounts of time preparing their
voir dire examinations. And, unfortunately, because many courtrooms
are overburdened with cases, prosecutors often spend time preparing
voir dire examinations that are never conducted because cases often plea
bargain right before trial. Eliminating the right to a jury trial would thus
save resources that are inefficiently spent on voir dire.
Moving to bench trials also would eliminate the sometimes time-
consuming and often contentious peremptory challenge process. Even in
200. See JACOBS, supra note 21, at xviii.
201. See Crime in the United States 2009, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_29.html (last visited Mar. 19,2011).
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misdemeanor cases, prosecutors and defense attorneys are typically
afforded peremptory challenges to strike jurors who they view as
unfavorable. 202 If nothing contentious occurs, the lawyers simply submit
their peremptory challenges to the judge and the prospective jurors are
stricken very quickly. If either side, however, believes its adversary has
used peremptory strikes based on race or gender, a time-consuming
hearing must be held to determine if a constitutional violation has
occurred under the Supreme Court's Batson v. Kentucky decision.203  If
the judge finds a violation, some jurisdictions require that a new jury be
impaneled and that jury selection be restarted from scratch. 204 And even
if the trial judge rejects the Batson challenge, the defendant then has an
issue that he can raise on appeal if he is convicted. Eliminating the right
to a jury trial eliminates the peremptory challenge problem altogether.
Finally, and most obviously, eliminating jury trials would save the
time and expense of the jurors themselves. Each year there are likely
well in excess of 10,000 DWI jury trials in the United States, most of
which are for first offenders. 205 Moreover, in some cases a venire is
brought to the courtroom only to have the case plea bargain after the
jurors are forced to sit through voir dire and possibly even part of the
trial itself. Assuming that 10,000 first-offense DWIs are prosecuted
before juries in the United States each year and that a venire of twenty
prospective jurors is used for each jury trial, that translates into 200,000
prospective jurors per year. Some of these jurors could be spared the
financial hardship of jury service altogether. 206 More importantly, some
of these jurors could be shifted to other courtrooms to ensure that there
is a sufficient number of jurors for other cases. Presently, judges
sometimes have to delay trials when a venire lacks a sufficient number of
prospective jurors or when the lawyers "bust" the panel by striking such
a large number of jurors for cause that there are not enough remaining
bodies to fill the jury box. Moving DWI jurors to other cases would thus
ensure that jury trials of more serious offenses are not delayed because
of a lack of eligible jurors.
202. See Roger Allan Ford, Modeling the Effects of Peremptory Challenges on Jury Selection and
Jury Verdicts, 17 GEO. MASON L. REv. 377, 381 (2010) ("[N]early all states give each side two to six
challenges in misdemeanor trials.").
203. 476 U.S. 79, 188-89 (1986) (forbidding peremptory strikes based on race).
204. See id. at 99 n.24; Cheryl A.C. Brown, Challenging the Challenge: Twelve Years After Batson,
Courts Are Still Struggling to Fill in the Gaps Left by the Supreme Court, 28 U. BALT. L. REv. 379, 408-
09 (1999) (noting that a "number of jurisdictions" provide for a new jury as the remedy for a Batson
violation).
205. National statistics are unavailable because many states do not keep data. Nevertheless, when
one considers that there were 1825 DWI jury trials in Texas alone during the single year from mid-
2007 until mid-2008, it is a fair estimate that there are in excess of 10,000 jury trials nationwide. See
TEx. ADMIN. OFF. OF COURTS, AcIVITY SUMMARY BY CASE TYPE: SEPT. 1, 2007 To AUG. 31, 2008
(on file with the author).
206. See Gloria Hillard, Recession Hits the Jury Box, NAT'L PUB. RADIo (Oct. 19, 2009), http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=113800461 (discussing how the recession has hindered
jury service).
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b. Shortening the Duration of Trials
Eliminating juries for first-offense DWI trials will also shorten the
duration of trials by reducing the time spent on opening statements,
closing arguments, and questioning of witnesses. Simply put, judges need
far less background information than jurors to understand the big picture
theme and particular facts of individual cases. Not only are judges
familiar with the law that governs DWI cases, but ruling on pretrial
motions and perhaps overhearing plea bargaining discussions givesjudges a good sense of the gist of the case before the trial even begins.
This means that opening statements and closing arguments will not have
to be as detailed, and there will be no need for lawyers to spend time
explaining to the fact-finder what the legal rules mean and how they
apply to the facts of a particular case.
The time savings will be even greater with the examination of
witnesses. The typical DWI case involves testimony of officers who
performed sobriety tests and chemists who explain breathalyzer tests.
Judges have seen these types of witnesses dozens or even hundreds of
times in the past. They are aware of the training the police and experts
have received and how they perform their basic job responsibilities.
Judges will require very little background testimony to assess the
credibility and factual assertions of such witnesses. Jurors, by contrast,
typically have no familiarity with police training and the mechanics of
breathalyzers and other field sobriety tests. Prosecutors are therefore
required to elicit lengthy background information through direct
examination. Prosecutors likewise spend considerable time reviewing
how breathalyzers are calibrated and why other field sobriety tests are
accurate. In a DWI jury trial it is therefore not surprising to see
prosecutors spend time on where police officers were trained, the exact
training received, their employment history at the police department,
and other background information. Defense attorneys, in turn, then
conduct detailed cross-examination that could raise doubts about the
training and scientific methodology of the witnesses. This lengthy
testimony would not be completely eliminated in bench trials. Defense
attorneys still will try to impeach experts, but the time they take to do so
would be substantially reduced.
c. Reducing Trials by Encouraging Plea Bargaining
If states eliminate the right to jury trials for first-offense DWI
prosecutions, it will almost surely reduce the number of DWI cases
proceeding to trial. Trials, of course, are very time-consuming. Fewer
trials will therefore mean a reduced workload for prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and judges. The reduced workload will in turn provide
prosecutors and defense lawyers with more time to spend investigating
and preparing their other cases.
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The reason that abolishing the right to a jury trial will result in more
plea bargaining is that bench trials are far more predictable than jury
trials. When a defendant is deciding whether to gamble on a jury trial,
she has no idea who will be on her jury and whether they might be
favorable to her. Before the day of trial, a defendant might hope to have
a jury that is demographically similar to her and that can identify with
her. She might expect that her lawyer, whom she may have paid a hefty
sum, will have a good rapport with the jury. Or she might hope that the
prosecutor will perform poorly. In short, there are many unknown
variables about how a jury trial might break. Because many first-offense
DWI defendants have no prior experience with the criminal justice
system, they likely have little personal information to fill in the
informational gaps.207 Optimistic defendants -particularly successful
individuals who are used to having things go their way-may choose to
assume that the unknowns will break in their favor. These defendants
might therefore be more willing to take their cases all the way to a jury
trial and hope for the best.
Although bench trials also carry some uncertainty, there would be
far fewer unknowns than in jury trials. Recall that first-offense DWI is
one of the most common crimes committed in the United States.208 In a
regime where all first-offense DWIs are tried to the court, the same
judges would be called on to resolve numerous cases. It therefore would
quickly become clear to the repeat players in the criminal justice
system -particularly highly-paid DWI defense lawyers-whether judges
are prone to convict or acquit in run-of-the-mill DWI cases. And if the
social science evidence described in Part IV.A is correct, judges in
general will be more willing to convict than juries.209 Competent defense
attorneys will of course relay this information to their clients. Instead of
the defense attorney telling her client that he "might draw a really
favorable jury," the lawyer will inform the defendant that when a
defendant has exceeded .08 on the breathalyzer, Judge Smith has voted
to convict in almost every case.
A competent defense attorney will also then explain the "trial
penalty," whereby defendants who have pushed cases to trial typically
are sentenced to tougher punishments.210 Once judges have established a
pattern of regularly convicting individuals who have failed breathalyzer
tests, they may have little patience for new defendants who insist on
going to trial. Therefore, there is reason to believe the "trial penalty"
will be even more pronounced in DWI cases. Defense attorneys will of
207. See Bibas, supra note 145, at 924-29.
208. See Black, supra note 155, at 463.
209. See supra Part IV.A.
210. See Donald A. Dripps, On Cases, Casebooks, and the Real World of Criminal Justice: A Brief
Response to Anders Walker, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 257, 259 (2009) (describing the trial penalty as "the
single most important institutional fact a criminal lawyer can know").
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course convey to their clients the relevant information about the trial
penalty and a judge's conviction rate. Once defendants have solid
information on judges' conviction rates and the attendant trial penalty,
the gamble on going to trial should look far less attractive. Put simply, a
defendant faced with much greater certainty of conviction and the
prospect of an annoyed judge meting out a tougher sentence will be more
likely to plea bargain. And for defendants who were already leaning
toward pleading guilty, the greater certainty of the outcome will move
them to do so more quickly. Not surprisingly, data already demonstrates
that the time between charging and verdict is almost five times faster in
bench trials than jury trials.2"
Of course, the scenario described above is only a general pattern;
specific cases will differ. Some judges will not be more conviction-prone
than juries. Other judges will not impose any type of trial penalty. Thesejudges will likely be the exception, not the rule. And they may very
quickly discover that being the exception carries baggage. The docket in
their courtrooms will swell beyond that of other judges because fewer
cases will plea bargain and more court time will be spent handling DWI
trials. Thus, while some judges might continue to be less conviction-
prone than their colleagues in DWI cases, others might slowly discover
that they are the outliers and begin to change their approach.
Even if a small percentage of judges are not tougher than juries, the
overall effect of eliminating jury trials will be substantial. Fewer and
faster DWI trials will reduce the workload of the lawyers handling the
cases. This will be helpful to busy public defenders (who handle some
DWI cases) and very helpful to prosecutors (who handle lots of DWI
cases). While many observers are aware that public defenders and
appointed lawyers face excessive caseloads,212 it is also the case that
prosecutors in some jurisdictions are terribly overburdened. For
instance, a recent analysis of the McLennan County District Attorney's
Office in Texas found that the twenty-four prosecutors in that office were
responsible for 3600 felonies and more than 8000 misdemeanors in a
single year.213 That works out to each attorney having between 300 and
500 open cases at any given time.214 If DWI cases were processed
211. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATIsTICS-2003, at 447 tbl.5.43 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 31st ed. 2004)(finding in a 2003 review of federal cases that bench trials were resolved 2.6 months after charges were
filed compared with 12.3 months for cases that were tried to juries).
212. See, e.g., Backus & Marcus, supra note 110, at 118.
213. See, e.g., Cindy V. Culp, Data Offer Clues on McLennan Country District Attorney's
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quicker, these lawyers would be able to devote more of their attention to
violent crimes and other complicated cases.15
VI. How STATES CAN REVISE THEIR STATUTES TO ELIMINATE THE
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
As explained in Part III, the petty offense doctrine authorizes states
to eliminate jury trials for first-offense DWI prosecutions so long as the
maximum punishment does not exceed six months' incarceration. 2 11
States' ability to implement this proposal depends on how their criminal
code is drafted, the punishment ranges currently in place, and whether
their state courts have embraced the petty offense doctrine under their
state constitutions. In some states, eliminating the right to a jury trial
would be as simple as adding a clause to the DWI statute. In other
states, more in-depth changes to the criminal code would be necessary,
though not onerous. At present, only a handful of states have eliminated
the right to a jury trial for low-level DWI offenses. 217 While my proposal
is foreclosed in about ten states that have rejected the petty offense
doctrine,2 18 the proposal could be adopted in nearly thirty states. Below,
I provide a roadmap for these nearly thirty states to eliminate the right to
a jury trial for first-time DWI offenses.
A. Adding Simple Language to the Code to Eliminate the Right to a Jury
Trial
In at least twelve states219-and possibly three others220 - legislatures
could eliminate the right to a jury trial for certain first-offense DWI
215. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
461, 461 (2007) (suggesting that states cease appointing free lawyers to indigent misdemeanor
defendants to reallocate attorney time to more serious cases).
216. See supra Part III.
217. See supra note 61.
218. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
219. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, and South Carolina.
220. Three states-Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Utah-appear not to have addressed whether the
petty offense doctrine applies under their state constitutions. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
noted that criminal defendants' jury trial rights derive from the Minnesota Constitution, but it pointed
to a state statute defining "crime" as the reason why all defendants facing incarceration are entitled to
a jury trial. See State v. Weltzin, 630 N.W.2d 406, 410-11 (Minn. 2001). The Weltzin decision
conducted no substantive analysis of whether the federal petty offense doctrine should apply under
Minnesota constitutional law. If Minnesota were to embrace the petty offense doctrine, it would be
free to eliminate jury trials for first-time DWI prosecutions, which carry a maximum sentence of only
ninety days. See MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.27, 609.02 (2009). The Wisconsin Supreme Court appears not
to have ruled on the merits of a petty offense challenge, although it has noted in dicta in a civil case
that even in criminal proceedings, trial by jury is not invariably required. See Layton Sch. of Art and
Design v. Wis. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 262 N.W.2d 218, 235 & 235 n.36 (Wis. 1978) (citing the
federal petty offense cases). In Wisconsin, first-time DWI offenders are punishable by up to six
months incarceration, see Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 343.65, 346.63(1) (West 2010), but are guaranteed a jury
trial by statute, see WIS. STAT. ANN. § 800.04(1)(d). Finally, in a Utah case, the Utah Supreme Court
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prosecutions by simply adding a clause to the existing statute. In these
states, the punishment for first-offense DWI does not exceed six months
and, therefore, there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial.2 2 1
Moreover, these states appear to have embraced the petty offense
doctrine under their own state222 constitutions.223 Thus, the legislatures of
these states would simply have to add a short clause to their DWI
statutes specifying that, "for prosecutions under this section of the code,
the trial shall be by judge, not jury."
Kentucky provides a good example of the simplicity and benefits of
abolishing the jury-trial right in low-level DWI cases. Under Kentucky
law, a first-time DWI is punishable by up to thirty days in jail, and a
second offense carries a maximum sentence of only six months'
incarceration.224 Both offenses are thus petty and could be tried in bench
trials without violating the U.S. Constitution. And the Supreme Court of
Kentucky has recognized that there is no state or federal constitutional
right to a jury trial for such misdemeanor DWI prosecutions. 225
approvingly cited the federal petty offense doctrine, but refused to assess the issue under the state
constitution because it was not properly briefed. See West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371,
374-75 (Utah 1997). In Utah, first-time DWI offenses are punishable by up to six months'
incarceration, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-503 (LexisNexis 2010), but are guaranteed a jury trial by
state statute, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-6-2(e) (LexisNexis 2008).
221. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-707(A)(1), 28-1381(F) (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-
1301(7)(b)(i) (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227(a)(g) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4177(d)(1)
(2001); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501(c)(3) (2006); IND. CODE § 9-30-5-1(a) (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-1567(d) (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.010(5)(b) (West 2009); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP.
§ 27-101(c)(23)-(24) (West 2008); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 558.011(1)(6), 577.010 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-106(1) (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2930(A)(1) (2006).
222. See Benitez v. Dunevant, 7 P.3d 99, 102 (Ariz. 2000); Austin v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 462
P.2d 600, 602 (Colo. 1969); Wilson v. Cohen, 610 A.2d 1177, 1182 (Conn. 1992); Thomas v. State, 331
A.2d 147, 150 (Del. 1975); People v. Dorris, 373 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Holly v. State, 681
N.E.2d 1176, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Shannon, 905 P.2d 649, 656 (Kan. 1995);
Commonwealth v. Green, 194 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Ky. 2006); Fisher v. State, 504 A.2d 626, 627 (Md.
1986); Ryan v. Moreland, 653 S.W.2d 244, 248 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Bishop, 399 N.W.2d 271,
276 (Neb. 1987); State v. Passmore, 611 S.E.2d 273, 275 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).
223. While a number of the cases adopting the petty offense doctrine have occurred in the context
of criminal contempt charges-specifically the Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, and South
Carolina cases cited supra note 222-rather than ordinary criminal cases, the reason for that is likely
that these states have statutes (rather than state constitutional protections) that guarantee jury trial
rights to ordinary criminal defendants. Although some litigation may be required in these states to
clarify that the petty offense doctrine applies to all criminal cases, not just criminal contempt cases,
there would appear to be a strong case for embracing the doctrine in all low-level misdemeanors.
Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized over forty years ago that "criminal contempt is a crime in every
fundamental respect" and that "there is no substantial difference between serious contempts and other
serious crimes." Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1968). Furthermore, the Court's decision in
Bloom was issued the same day as Duncan v. Louisiana, and it explained that by "deciding to treat
criminal contempt like other crimes insofar as the right to jury trial is concerned, we similarly place it
under the rule that petty crimes need not be tried to a jury." Id. at 210. Nevertheless, at least one
court has tried to distinguish criminal contempt cases in rejecting the petty offense doctrine. See
People v. Antkoviak, 619 N.W.2d 18, 40 (Mich. App. 2000) (contending that "contempt cases are not
precisely criminal cases").
224. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.010(5)(a)-(b).
225. See Commonwealth v. Green, 194 S.W.3d 277, 285 (Ky. 2006). Interestingly, in Green, it was
the prosecution, not the defendant, that demanded the jury trial. It is impossible to know the reason
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Kentucky recently concluded that
DWI defendants have a statutory right to a jury trial in all criminal
prosecutions, including traffic violations. 26
A simple legislative enactment could eliminate the statutory right to
a jury trial in first- and second-offense DWI cases in Kentucky. The
resources saved would be substantial. In 2008, Kentucky prosecutors
filed nearly 35,000 first-time DWI cases and over 9000 second-time
cases. 227 Some of these roughly 44,000 cases were tried to juries, and in a
much larger number of cases, defendants almost certainly invoked their
jury trial rights (thus leading to scheduling delays and additional court
settings) before eventually pleading guilty.22" In addition to efficiency
savings, Kentucky might benefit from an added deterrence achieved
from improving the certainty and celerity of punishment. Kentucky
ranks above the national average in alcohol-related fatalities in the
United States. 229 In 2008, Kentucky had 826 traffic fatalities, of which 200
were alcohol-related.230 If even a few of these fatalities (not to mention
other damaging accidents) could be reduced through improved
deterrence, that benefit alone would be significant.
B. Lowering the Maximum Punishment to Six Months or Less
In eight states,231 transitioning to a bench trial regime would be
slightly more difficult because, while the states embrace the petty offense
doctrine, 23 2 they impose a maximum punishment for first-time DWI that
exceeds six months. 233  Thus, under their present statutes, these states
for this unusual turn of events, but it may be that the trial judge was seen as unlikely to convict in DWI
cases.
226. Id. at 284-85 (citing KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29A.270(1)).
227. See KENTUCKY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS: CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT
DUI REPORT BY OFFENSE: STATEWIDE (provided by Kentucky Department of Court Services and on
file with the author) (listing over 34,000 first-time and nearly 9000 second-time DWI cases filed in
Kentucky district courts, and over 650 first-time and nearly 300 second-time cases filed in circuit
courts).
228. Although the Kentucky Administrative Office of the Courts did not have statistics available
for jury trials and eventual plea agreements, intuition and experience suggest that many of these
defendants must have demanded jury trials, and some of those who demanded jury trials must have
reached a plea agreement prior to trial.
229. See Full List: Worst States for Drunk Drivers, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.forbes.
com/2009/12/18/drunk-driving-states-lifestyle-vehicles-intoxicated-madd-bacchart.html.
230. Id.
231. The states are Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina,
Oregon, and Virginia.
232. See Clemmons v. City of Muscle Shoals, 565 So. 2d 683 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); Perroni v.
State, 186 S.W.3d 206 (Ark. 2004); Marzen v. Klousia, 316 N.W.2d 688, 690 (Iowa 1982) (limiting petty
offense doctrine to cases with maximum sentences of thirty days); In re DeSaulnier, 279 N.E.2d 287
(Mass. 1971); People v. Harris, 828 N.Y.S.2d 832 (N.Y. City Ct. 2006); State v. Morris, 165 S.E.2d 245
(N.C. 1969); In re Stevenson, 458 P.2d 414 (Or. 1969) (en banc); Ragsdale v. City of Danville, 82 S.E.
77 (Va. 1914).
233. See ALA. CODE § 32-5A-191(e) (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-111(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2009);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 321J.2, 903.1(b) (Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (2005); N.Y. VEH. &
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cannot constitutionally invoke the petty offense doctrine. But, if they
simply lowered the maximum incarceration period for first-time
offenders, they would be free to abolish jury trials.234
Massachusetts provides a good example. First-time DWI offenders
in Massachusetts face the toughest maximum punishment in the nation:
two-and-a-half years' imprisonment. 5 Yet, when first-time offenders are
actually sentenced they typically receive no jail time whatsoever.23 The
website of one Massachusetts DWI defense lawyer explains that,
although the authorized penalty for first offenders is "not more than 2 2
years [in the] House of Correction . .. 99.9% of the cases" qualify for an
"alternative disposition" which does not include jail time.237  Because
Massachusetts has recognized the petty offense doctrine,"* the legislature
would be free to abolish the right to a jury trial for first offenses if it
lowered the maximum punishment to six months instead of the almost-
never-enforced two-and-a-half years.
As a matter of legislative drafting, it is simple for states to bring
themselves within the petty offense doctrine. The easiest approach
would be for legislatures in these states to reduce the maximum sentence
for all first-time DWI offenders to six months so that the crime would fall
within the petty offense doctrine. Alternatively, legislatures could create
a graded DWI statute in which less serious first-time offenders face a
maximum sentence of six months or less, while more serious first-time
defendants face longer sentences. Many states have already adopted
such an approach.239 For example, New Hampshire differentiates
between "ordinary" offenders with blood alcohol levels up to .16 and
"aggravated" offenders who have levels in excess of .16.240 Given that
judges are more likely to impose tougher sentences on offenders with
higher blood alcohol levels, it makes logical sense to have the "ordinary"
offenders face no more than six months' incarceration (and therefore
TRAF. LAW ANN. § 1193(1)(b) (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179(g) (2009); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 161.615(1), 813.010(4) (2009); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-11, 18.2-270 (2009).
234. Of course, states also would have to eliminate any statutory jury trial guarantee as well.
235. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24.
236. See Massachusetts Drunk DrivingIDUIDWI/OUI Laws & Penalties, MASS. DRUNK DRIVING
DEFENSE, http://www.madrunkdrivingdefense.com/drunk-driving.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2011)
(explaining the "minimum penalty" that is available to first-time offenders who plead guilty and have
a "smart attorney").
237. See Massachusetts OUI Law, LAW OFFICE OF STEPHEN L. JONES, http://www.dwilawoffice.
com/massachusetts oui law.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2011).
238. See In re DeSaulnier, 279 N.E.2d 287, 290 (Mass. 1971) (recognizing the petty offense
doctrine in the context of criminal contempt charges).
239. New York, which punishes DWI with a maximum sentence of one year, has taken this
approach with the lesser infraction of Driving While Ability Impaired, which involves a blood alcohol
level of .05 to .07 and carries a maximum sentence of fifteen days. See supra note 61 and
accompanying text. New York easily could create a similarly graded system for the crime of DWI and
punish offenders with blood alcohol levels of .08 to (for example) .14 with only up to six months'
incarceration, rather than imposing a maximum sentence of one year for all DWI offenders.
240. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265-A:3, 18 (2004).
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have no jury trial) while authorizing a longer sentence (and therefore a
right to a jury trial) for the "aggravated" offenders.
Although the actual drafting and logic of such a regime is quite
simple, the more difficult problem is that legislatures are typically
reluctant to reduce criminal punishments because of the risk of being
seen as soft on crime. Given the influence of MADD and other interest
groups, legislators have an incentive to raise punishment ranges, not
reduce them.2 41 Yet, this political problem would likely be averted if
MADD and other advocacy groups supported the legislation to reduce
the maximum punishment. And MADD would be wise to support a
reduction.
As noted above, the reality is that almost no first-time DWI
defendants ever receive anywhere close to a year or longer in jail.2 42 And
although states may want to punish first-time DWI offenders with long
sentences if they have lengthy criminal histories, that can be
accomplished with a separate statutory scheme for recidivists that would
not affect the bulk of first-time DWI offenders.
The only real benefit provided by having punishments in excess of
six months for first-time DWI offenders is that it amounts to a symbolic
statement: the state takes DWI very seriously. Yet, the expressive value
of a tough maximum sentence may actually be counterproductive if
drivers are aware that the outer punishment range of the statute is never
enforced. Put more simply, it does little good to have a lengthy
punishment range if no one ever receives that punishment and ordinary
citizens know that no one receives that punishment. Moreover, social
scientists have found that when jurors are aware that DWI defendants
face tough penalties, the jurors actually become less likely to convict.2 43
By contrast, recall that social science data indicates that judges are
more likely to convict than juries, and that certainty of punishment is the
most important factor in achieving deterrence. 2" Interest groups such as
MADD might be willing to trade an unenforced lengthy punishment
range for a shorter sentencing range that holds more defendants
accountable and has a better chance of deterring DWI. If MADD and
other interest groups were to make this strategic calculation, political
opposition to reducing the sentencing range might be neutralized. In
turn, legislators might be willing to vote for such a bill.
241. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 959, 966 (2009) (explaining that legislatures increase sentences and "broaden prosecutorial
power to burnish their tough-on-crime credentials").
242. See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 154.
244. See supra Parts IV.A and V.A.
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C. Carving Out a Small Category of Cases in Which No Jail Time Can
Be Imposed
The biggest obstacle to eliminating the right to a jury trial for first-
offense DWI trials is that some states have rejected the petty offense
doctrine under their state constitutions. These states break down into
two categories. In ten jurisdictions, the state constitution has been
interpreted to require jury trials for all criminal offenses, even those that
carry only a fine and no jail time.245 In order to implement my proposal
in these states, legislators would have to pass a statute they know to be
unconstitutional and then ask their state supreme court to overrule its
prior precedent and accept the petty offense doctrine. Obviously, such a
scenario is very unlikely.
In at least seven states,246 however, state courts have only forbidden
the abolition of jury trial rights when defendants face incarceration. 24 7 In
other words, these states have not rejected the petty offense doctrine for
crimes where the maximum punishment is only a fine. Thus, if states
were to carve out a separate and very narrow DWI offense that does not
carry any jail time, they would be free to abolish the right to a jury trial.24 8
245. See Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970); Geng v. State, 578 S.E.2d 115
(Ga. 2003); State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974); People v. Antkoviak, 619 N.W.2d 18,41 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2000); State v. Rensvold, 139 P.3d 154 (Mont. 2006); City of Bismark v. Fettig, 601 N.W.2d 247,
251 (N.D. 1999); State v. Dusina, 764 S.W.2d 766 (Tenn. 1989); Franklin v. State, 576 S.W.2d 621 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978) (en banc); State v. Becker, 287 A.2d 580 (Vt. 1972); City of Pasco v. Mace, 653 P.2d
618 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
246. These states include California, Idaho, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West Virginia, and
Wyoming, all of which carry a maximum sentence for first-offenders of six months or less. See CAL.
VEH. CODE §§ 23152, 23536 (West Supp. 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-8004(1)(a), 18-8005(1)(a)
(Supp. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4511.19, 2929.24 (West 2010 & 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47,§ 11-902 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-2, 32-23-2 (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-7-18b(d)
(2004); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-233 (2009). Additionally, the issue is unresolved in Rhode Island,
where the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not determined whether violations carrying a maximum
fine of $500 are entitled to a jury trial. See State v. Vinagro, 433 A.2d 945, 949 n.6 (R.I. 1981). At
present, Rhode Island punishes first-offenders with up to one year in jail, see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-
2(d) (Supp. 2009), thus making a $500 maximum fine a very unlikely change.
247. See OKLA. CONST., art. II, § 19 (stating that the right to jury trial does not apply to cases
where the maximum sentence is a fine of $1500 or less); Mitchell v. Superior Court, 783 P.2d 731, 738
(Cal. 1989) ("Under the California Constitution, only infractions not punishable by imprisonment are
not within the jury trial guaranty." (citations omitted)); State v. Bennion, 730 P.2d 952, 964 (Idaho
1986) (concluding that the state constitution "guarantees a jury trial whenever the possible sanction
includes imprisonment"); State v. Tate, 391 N.E.2d 738, 739 n.2 (Ohio 1979) (quoting state
constitution which guarantees a jury trial "except... in cases involving offenses for which the penalty
provided is less than imprisonment in the penitentiary"); State v. Bowers, 498 N.W.2d 202 (S.D. 1993)
(holding that there is no state constitutional right to a jury trial, even for offense carrying a possibility
of up to six months incarceration, if no jail sentence is actually imposed); Gapp v. Friddle, 382 S.E.2d
568, 569 (W. Va. 1989) ("Under art. 3, § 14 of the West Virginia Constitution, the right to a jury trial is
accorded in both felonies and misdemeanors when the penalty imposed involves any period of
incarceration."); Brenner v. City of Casper, 723 P.2d 558, 561 (Wyo. 1986) ("[W]e hold that a crime
punishable by any jail term, regardless of length, is a serious crime subject to the constitutional right to
a jury trial.").
248. Professor H. Laurence Ross has suggested that legislatures decriminalize first-time DWI
offenses so that they can be handled as administrative proceedings which carry few procedural
1006 [Vol. 2011
ELIMINATING JURY TRIALS FOR DRUNK DRIVING
For example, a state could re-grade its DWI statute to carve out a
separate offense for first-time offenders who had blood alcohol levels of
.08 to .14. Defendants with these unlawful (though not egregiously high)
blood alcohol levels could face a stiff fine, loss of their drivers' licenses,
and community service, but no actual jail sentences. Eliminating the
prospect of a jail sentence would in turn eliminate the right to a jury trial.
A few states have already embraced this idea. For instance, in New
Hampshire, a typical first-time DWI offender faces a $500 fine, license
revocation, and a driver intervention program, but has no right to a jury
trial.249 If, however, the offender commits an aggravated first offense-
by driving more than thirty miles over the speed limit, causing a collision
resulting in serious bodily injury, attempting to elude a police officer,
carrying a passenger under sixteen years of age, or having a blood
alcohol level in excess of .16-the defendant faces jail time and has the
right to a jury trial.25 1
Of course, the idea of taking a category of DWI offenders who face
jail time and downgrading the maximum punishment to a fine would
likely not be popular with interest groups such as MADD and legislators
who are usually inclined to increase rather than decrease punishments.
As a matter of public policy, however, such an approach may make
sense.
First, creating a category of "fine only" DWI offenses would be in
line with the actual (as opposed to the authorized) punishment that many
first-time offenders with comparatively low blood alcohol levels currently
receive. In a way, creating a category of "fine only" DWI offenses would
amount to a truth-in-charging statute, in which prosecutors seek
convictions and sentences specified under the statute, rather than
charging someone with an offense carrying up to six months in jail and
plea bargaining the case for a fine instead of jail time.
Second, as noted above, eliminating the right to a jury trial would
level the playing field for prosecutors, thus making it easier to convict
defendants and reducing the resources that must be spent on each case."'
protections and consequently result in a greater certainty and celerity of punishment and hence
improved deterrence. See Ross, supra note 154, at 110. One commentator is skeptical of such an
approach because it would send "a symbolic message to the public that alcohol impaired driving is
nothing more than a minor traffic offense or routine violation." Cafaro, supra note 28, at 26. As
explained below, my proposal would not be vulnerable to this criticism because defendants would still
be charged with a criminal offense and conviction for first-time offenders could still be used to
enhance penalties for recidivists.
249. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265-A:18 (Supp. 2009).
250. See id. (increasing the minimum fine to $750 as well as the prospect of at least ten days in
jail). Pennsylvania similarly has a graded approach, although it recognizes the petty offense doctrine
and declines to provide a jury trial to defendants facing six months' or less incarceration. Ordinary
first-offenders in Pennsylvania face no jail time. If defendants' blood alcohol levels are in excess of
.16, however, or if they refused to take the breathalyzer test, defendants face at least seventy-two
hours of incarceration. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3802(c), 3804(c)(3) (2006).
251. See supra notes 200-15 and accompanying text.
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Anecdotally, prosecutors report that it is very difficult to convince juries
to convict first-offense DWI defendants with comparatively low blood
alcohol levels. Eliminating jail time, and thus the right to a jury trial,
probably would increase the conviction rate.
Third, and related, studies suggest that for low-level offenses such as
DWI, the stigma of conviction may serve as a more important deterrent
than the accompanying punishment. For instance, in a study of college
students, researchers found that subjects put a greater monetary value on
avoiding the stigma of a DWI conviction than on avoiding the punitive
consequences (such as license suspension) that accompanied a
conviction.252 Similarly, in a study following the Vietnam War,
researchers found that for middle-class defendants charged with draft
evasion, the stigma of being convicted was the dominant factor in
achieving deterrence. 253
Fourth, there is actually little evidence that sentencing DWI
defendants to jail is a successful deterrent. In reviewing deterrence
studies of DWI jurisdictions that imposed mandatory jail time on
offenders, Professor Ross and his colleagues concluded that most studies
"failed to find evidence for effectiveness of jail."25 4  In a study of
Arizona's mandatory one-day-in-jail law, Ross concluded that jail time
"very likely had no important deterrent effect." 255 Indeed, according to
defense attorneys who were surveyed, "the punishment most threatening
to their clients was not jail, but license suspension." 256  The
ineffectiveness of possible jail sentences is consistent with the certainty
and severity literature discussed in Part V. Studies have consistently
found that when the certainty of punishment for DWI remains low,
increasing the severity of punishment, even to include jail time, does not
improve deterrence.2'
Fifth, even if more severe sanctions did enhance deterrence,
eliminating jail time would not be counterproductive because
inexperienced criminals often believe punishments to be harsher than
they actually are. Studies of offender characteristics have found that
individuals who have rarely committed criminal infractions tend to fear
punishment more than experienced criminals,"5 and they tend to believe
that punishments are more severe than those actually prescribed by
252. Nagin & Pogarsky, supra note 179, at 879.
253. Blumstein & Nagin, supra note 165, at 269.
254. Ross et al., supra note 1, at 158.
255. Id. at 163.
256. Id. at 164; see also Ross, supra note 167, at 68 (explaining that the penalty most feared in the
British Road Safety Act was "disqualification or loss of the driver's license for a year").
257. Ross, supra note 176, at 167.
258. See, e.g., Greg Pogarsky et al., Modeling Change in Perceptions About Sanction Threats: The
Neglected Linkage in Deterrence Theory, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 343,349 (2004).
1008 [Vol. 2011
ELIMINATING JURY TRIALS FOR DRUNK DRIVING
law.259 Because first-time DWI offenders are often otherwise law-abiding
individuals, they are likely to overestimate the punishment they would
face if convicted. Thus, they may fear jail time even when it is not an
authorized sanction.
Finally, criminologists have demonstrated that more severe
punishments are more "fiercely resisted"260 and can result in court
backlogs.261 For instance, when Arizona revised its DWI laws to impose a
mandatory twenty-four hours in jail for anyone convicted, the justice
system slowed down dramatically in counties that abided by the law.26 2
The Arizona law led more defendants to retain private lawyers and
demand jury trials. 263 In Phoenix, the mandatory jail law resulted in a
significant increase in trials and extra courtrooms had to be added.264
The average time from arrest to conviction more than doubled. 26 5
Increasing the severity of punishment thus undermined the celerity of
punishment and-if the high-priced lawyers were worth their fees-the
certainty of punishment. Given the consensus that certainty of
punishment is a far better deterrent than severity of punishment,2" the
imposition of jail time in some jurisdictions may actually hinder effective
DWI deterrence.
Of course, there are good reasons why legislatures would want their
DWI statutes to continue to carry jail time. First, each criminal case is
unique, and some culpable offenders will deserve jail time. Statutes that
authorize such jail time will afford judges the discretion to see that justice
is done. While this argument is initially appealing, the reality is that the
category of defendants at issue here-first-time offenders with lower
blood-alcohol levels-rarely receive jail time. By setting up a fine-only
class of DWI offenders, legislatures could allow the elimination of jury
trials, which would likely result in holding more guilty defendants
accountable and hopefully increasing deterrence. The benefits of such a
regime would seemingly outweigh the costs of allowing a small number
of culpable offenders to avoid a handful of days in jail.
A second reason why legislatures might shy away from eliminating
jail time for the lowest-level DWI offenses is that a sentencing regime
that authorizes jail time carries the expressive value of saying that all
259. See Paternoster et al., supra note 148, at 418 ("[Pjrior research has suggested that most
people perceive potential legal penalties to be more severe than they actually are and, compared with
offending populations, nonoffenders generally overestimate the presumptive severity of legal
penalties." (citations omitted)).
260. See MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: How TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND
LESS PUNISHMENT 93 (2009).
261. See Legge & Park, supra note 162, at 596 ("Severe sanctions in general have resulted in
accelerated plea bargaining and court backlogs and opposition by judges who prefer discretion.").
262. Ross et al., supra note 1, at 164-66.
263. See id. at 164.
264. Id. at 165.
265. Id.
266. See supra Part V.
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DWI offenses are serious and that all offenders-even those who barely
run afoul of the law-run the risk of incarceration. While this expressive
value cannot be denied, it of course is far less influential if offenders
know that jail time is almost never imposed. Moreover, the expressive
value may be outweighed by (1) the increased number of guilty
defendants who would be held responsible, (2) the increased deterrent
effect that would accompany a greater certainty of punishment, and
(3) the prosecution resources that would be saved.
In sum, a narrow, fine-only offense for defendants with low blood
alcohol levels might create a disincentive for some offenders to spend
time and money fighting a conviction. A fine-only framework thus
would increase the celerity and certainty of conviction, which is the best
approach for increasing deterrence.26 7
VII. CONCLUSION
In an effort to get tough on crime, legislatures' first instinct is often
to increase punishments. Over the last few decades, this has certainly
been the case for DWI. A large number of states now punish first-time
DWI offenders with sentences of up to six months, and some states
impose even tougher maximum punishments. But if legislatures' goal is
to hold guilty offenders accountable, they should leave the maximum
punishments where they are, or even lower them in some states. Rather
than increasing punishments, states should instead take advantage of the
petty offense doctrine and abolish the statutory right to jury trials for
DWI offenders facing up to six months' incarceration. Eliminating jury
trials would put defendants' fate in the hands of judges who are more
likely to convict. In turn, higher conviction rates would enhance the
certainty of punishment, a factor much more important than the severity
of punishment in achieving general deterrence. Additionally, bench
trials would be far more efficient because the greater certainty of
conviction would give defendants less reason to gamble on going to trial.
When trials did occur they would be much faster because there would be
no need to select juries, and lawyers would have to present far less
background information to already-knowledgeable judges. At present,
only a handful of states have opted to eliminate jury trials for first-
offense DWI defendants. If other states are interested in increasing
conviction rates and maximizing general deterrence, they should take the
steps outlined in this Article and eliminate the right to jury trials for first-
time DWI offenders.
267. See KLEIMAN, supra note 260, at 95 ("Since uncertainty, delay, and inaccurate perception all
limit the effectiveness of deterrent threats, designers of criminal-justice policies should look for ways
of increasing the probability of some nontrivial punishment for each offense, to reduce the time-gap
between offense and punishment, and make the risks of crime to criminals easier for them to
perceive.").
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